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ABSTRACT 
 
On 15 March 2006, the European Union adopted the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC
1
 
which regulated the Internet Service Providers storage of telecommunications data and could be 
used to fight serious crime in the European Union. This directive was needed, because people in 
the European Union needed a higher level of data protection. Since multiple countries had their 
own data retention laws, the European Parliament and the Council saw the need to harmonise 
and strengthen the data retention in the European Union. Despite the noble intentions, the 
European Court of Justice declared it invalid on 8 April 2014.
2
 Yet, the essence of the Directive 
was transposed to each and every national data retention law across European Union. In this 
master thesis, author examines whether member states, but particularly, The Republic of Latvia 
has learned anything from the invalidation of the Directive 2006/24/EC. The author of this thesis 
will first of all, look into the adoption and invalidation reasons of the Directive 2006/24/EC. 
Following that the author will look into the to see if there is any resemblance to the Directive 
2006/EC/24, considering the fact that this law consist of norms that are directly transposed from 
the Directive 2006/24/EC. In order to conclude whether the Electronic Communications Law is 
affecting the freedom, security and justice in Latvia, author will analyse whether the arguments 
presented by the European Court of Justice are applicable to the Electronic Communications 
Law
3
. 
Keywords: Data Retention; Electronic Communications; Telecommunication; Digital Rights 
Ireland; European Court of Justice; Right to Privacy; Data protection; The Directive 2006/24/EC. 
                                                          
1
 European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed April 2, 2020. 
2
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, 
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SUMMARRY 
 
On 1 May 2004 Latvia joined the European Union. As a member state, Latvia had to implement 
multiple directives into its national legislation. In this master thesis, author focused on the 
Directive 2006/24/EC, that upon adoption had to be incorporated into the Electronic 
Communications Law. This directive was transposed by all member states of the European 
Union in order to harmonise data retention laws within the European Union. Even though this 
directive was considered a controversial, countries did not hesitate to transpose the legal norms 
of the directive into their national laws.  
The same controversial questions were raised again, six years after the directive was adopted. 
This time, those questions came from Ireland and Austria and were submitted to the European 
Court of Justice. The final judgement of the case Digital Rights Ireland became one of the most 
known judgements in the field of the fundamental human rights. In this judgement the European 
Court of Justice analysed the compatibility of the European Union’s legislation with the 
fundamental human rights. This judgement has strengthened the fundamental human rights in the 
European Union.
4
  
Despite the argumentation of the European Court of Justices, not all member states learned from 
the mistakes of the past. To this day, there are still a few member states that has some part of the 
Directive 2006/24/EC included in their national laws. One of those member states is Latvia. The 
Electronic Communications Law, even with the recent amendments, the Electronic 
Communications Law have more than just a few legal norms of the Directive 2006/24/EC left.
5
  
In order to test whether the Electronic Communications Law is violating the fundamental rights 
just like the Directive 2006/24/EC, the author explained the history and issues of the Directive 
2006/24/EC. To understand the issue at hand, author explained the importance of the right to 
privacy and protection of personal data. Further, the validity of the Electronic Communications 
                                                          
4
 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others (Cases C-
293/12 and C‑ 594/12) EU:C:2014:238 08 April 2014. Available on:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0293 . Accessed on May 9, 2020. 
5
 Elektronisko sakaru likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 183, 17.11.2004. Available on: https://likumi.lv/ta/id/96611 
Accessed March 22, 2020,  
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Law was tested by applying the same arguments that were presented by the European Court of 
Justice.
6
  
Since this master thesis was written during the pandemic, author did a research on whether the 
new regulation affecting fundamental rights. New regulations were adopted in order to combat 
the COVID-19. Author saw this new regulation interesting, because it authorised another 
institution to have access to a personal data.  
This research is the first step towards a greater discussion. Unlike the other countries of the 
European Union, Latvia has chosen to stay silent on this topic. This is the first ever written 
research, that is questioning the validity of the Electronic Communications Law. To raise some 
sort of discussions, the author has submitted three questions to two state authorities and after 
receiving the answers, the author evaluated, whether those answers can hold up to the critique. It 
is important to raise an awareness of possible human rights or other right violation. However, the 
authors aim is to have this discussion to make the national legal system a better place, to improve 
it. Lawyers and other researchers tend to attack legislators or other state institutions if they find 
the smallest defect in our legal system. This master thesis consists of critique towards legislator 
of Latvia, but it is there to highlight the serious issues that the Electronic Communications Law 
is causing towards freedom, security, and justice in the Republic of Latvia. 
 
  
                                                          
6
 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and others (Cases C-
293/12 and C‑ 594/12) EU:C:2014:238 08 April 2014. Available on:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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Introduction 
 
Modern world and global society is challenging legislators around the world.
7
 Ever since people 
started using social media platforms, online stores and other possibilities that the internet gave 
us, became a challenge for legislators have been challenged on national and international level, 
because they have to come up with laws that would keep up with ever-growing electronic 
communications and find new ways how to safeguard people’s rights.8 
In the past twenty years, there have been plenty of laws that were trying to find the perfect 
balance between obtaining data for state security reasons and safeguarding fundamental human 
rights.
9
 In 2019 my attention was brought to European Union’s Directive 2006/24/EC10 because 
it seemed like a great tool for data related issue regulation. The Data Retention Directive
11
 also 
laid out the foundation for multiple member state’s national data retention laws that were 
invoked right after the Data Retention Directive came into force.
12
  
The Data Retention Directive helped to solve multiple criminal cases that included combatting 
terrorism, but it was not designed in a way to combat only criminal activities around European 
Union, this caused multiple controversial discussions.
13
 
Firstly, in this thesis I will discuss why Data Retention Directive
14
 was announced to be 
invalid
15
 by the European Court of Justice and which fundamental rights that were breached were 
                                                          
7
 Marcin Betkier. Privacy Online, Law and the Effective Regulation of Online Services, pp. 79-100. Intersentia, 
Cambridge, Antwerp, Chicago, 2019. 
8
 Anabela Susana De Sousa Goncalves, "Extraterritorial Application of the EU Directive on Data Protection, The," 
Spanish Yearbook of International Law 19 (2015): 195-210 Available on: 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.intyb/spanyb0019&i=195. Accessed 02.04.2020. 
9
 European Parliament and European Council. Directive 95/46/EC. Available on: https://europa.eu/!Xb76Xu  . 
Accessed on April 14, 2020. European Parliament and European Council. Directive 2002/58/EC. Available on: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32002L0058 Accessed April 9, 2020.; European 
Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: https://europa.eu/!dR36rY  
Accessed April 2, 2020. 
10
 European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY  Accessed April 2, 2020. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Library of Congress. European Union: ECJ Invalidates Data Retention Directive. Available on: 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/eu-data-retention-directive/eu.php  Accessed April 11, 2020.  
13
 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Evaluation report on the Data 
Retention Directive. Available on: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX%3A52011DC0225%3AEN%3AHTML Accessed April 14, 
2020. 
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in the opinion of the European Court of Justice.
16
 Since the Directive 2006/24/EC was 
transposed to multiple national laws in Europe, I examined what happened to those laws after 
this directive lost its powers, by researching case law of countries like Germany
17
, Ireland
18
and 
Hungary
19
, where courts declared that national laws are breaching the fundamental right to 
privacy.  
Secondly, I researched whether the Latvian national Electronic Communications Law
20
, that is 
implemented
21
 on the grounds of the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC
22
 can be considered 
lawful.
23
 In order to do so, I analysed existing case law in order to find out how other countries 
dealt with this issue and compared the Electronic Communications Law
24
 with the Directive 
2006/24/EC
25
. Further, I applied the proportionality test that helped to find out whether this law 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14
 European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY  Accessed April 2, 2020. 
15
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for 
Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others. Available 
on: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642&doclang=EN Accessed April 2, 2020. 
16
Council of Europe. European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8. Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. Accessed March 4, 2020; The European Parliament. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 7. Available on: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj  Accessed March 15, 2020. 
17
European Court of Human Rights, Weber and Saravia v. Germany, June 29, 2006. Available: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-76586  Accessed April 7, 2020. 
18
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2015. Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection 
Commissioner. Available on:  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62014CJ0362 
Accessed April 3, 2020. 
19
 European Court of Human Rights. Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary, no. 37138/14, 12 January 2016. Available on: 
https://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/jan/echr-case-SZAB-%20AND-VISSY-v-%20HUNGARY.pdf Accessed 
April 10, 2020. 
20
 Saeima. Grozījumi Elektronisko sakaru likumā. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 21, 30.01.2020. Available on: 
https://likumi.lv/ta/id/312285 . Accessed April 11, 2020.  
21
 2007. gada 3. maija likums "Grozījumi Elektronisko sakaru likumā". Latvijas Vēstnesis, 83, 24.05.2007. 
https://likumi.lv/ta/id/157642  
22
 European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed April 2, 2020. 
23
 Saeima. Grozījumi Elektronisko sakaru likumā, 47th point. Latvijas Republikas Saeimas un Ministru Kabineta 
Ziņotājs, 2004, 23.nr. 2005, 12.nr, 2006, 24.nr. 47. Punkts. Available on: 
http://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS/SaeimaLIVS.nsf/0/1568E003526986C4C22572E300412301?OpenDocument Accessed 
April 4, 2020.  
24
 Saeima. Grozījumi Elektronisko sakaru likumā. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 21, 30.01.2020. Available on: 
https://likumi.lv/ta/id/312285 . Accessed April 11, 2020. 
25
 European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed April 2, 2020. 
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is breaching fundamental human rights that are included in the Charter of fundamental rights of 
the European Union
26
 or the European Convention on Human Rights
27
. 
Thirdly, during my research, the whole world faced COVID-19 pandemic and Latvian 
authorities used Electronic Communications Law as a tool to limit the spread of COVID-19.
28
 In 
this part of the thesis I raised a question whether it is enough to declare national emergency for 
states to be excused of putting restrictions upon human rights. In order to raise a discussion I sent 
multiple questions to the Data State Inspectorate
29
 and Ministry of Transport of the Republic of 
Latvia
30
, because these are the institutions of competence over the Electronic Communications 
Law
31
. Once I received the answers, I argued whether I agree or disagree with them on the basis 
of my research results.   
Fourthly, I explained that the right to privacy is more than we are used to believe. Privacy is a 
right of the individual that allows persons a free and uninterrupted participation in public affairs 
and the free use of other fundamental rights, thus privacy can be used as a condition for the sole 
existence of constitutional democracy.
32
 Those rights can be restricted by states on multiple 
grounds, but the existing situation can be solved by other, less restrictive measures. 
Lastly, this research shall aim at reaching a conclusion on the legality of the Electronic 
Communications Law. This aim will be reached by comparing the Directive 2006/24/EC
33
 with 
the Electronic Communications Law and using both national and international case law in order 
to see how other states have dealt with this issue.  
Research questions: Is national law breaching the right to private life and the right to the 
protection of personal data? Can this law, despite its validity be unjust? Are there any similarities 
                                                          
26
 The European Parliament. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 7. Available on:  
http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj  Accessed March 15, 2020. 
27
The Council of Europe. European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8. Available on: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.  Accessed March 4, 2020 
28
 The State Chancellery. Stricter rules for physical distancing of persons are introduced to limit the spread of Covid-
19. Available on: https://www.mk.gov.lv/en/aktualitates/stricter-rules-physical-distancing-persons-are-introduced-
limit-spread-covid-19   Accessed April 4, 2020. 
29
 Data State Inspectorate. Available on: https://www.dvi.gov.lv/en/ Accessed on April 14, 2020.  
30
 The Ministry of Transport. Available on: http://www.sam.gov.lv/satmin/content/?cat=8  Accessed April 14, 2020. 
31Saeima. Grozījumi Elektronisko sakaru likumā. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 21, 30.01.2020. Available on: 
https://likumi.lv/ta/id/312285  . Accessed April 11, 2020. 
32
 Blanca R. Ruiz. Privacy in Telecommunications A European and an American Approach. Kluwer Law 
International the Hague, London, Boston. 1997 pp. 11-17. 
33
The European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed April 2, 2020. 
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between the Electronic Communications Law and the Directive 2006/24/EC? If there is, would 
that be enough to declare national law invalid? Can Latvian authorities use the Electronic 
Communications Law to limit the spread of COVID-19, despite the fact that it could breach 
fundamental human rights?  
  
10 
 
1. The Directive 2006/24/EC 
 
Firstly, in this thesis author will discuss the scope of the Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention 
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of public communications networks (further - the Directive).
34
 
Secondly, author will move on to the Electronic Communications Law of Latvia and lastly, 
author will evaluate how and if the Directive has any similarities with the Electronic 
Communications Law of Latvia.
35
  
 
The Directive
36
 was adopted, because the existing electronic communications regulations could 
not regulate data retention as well as it was needed, thus the Directive amended the Directive 
2002/58/EC.
37
  After the Commission presented an impact assessment in relation to the rules on 
the retention of traffic data, the Directive was established on the basis of Article 95 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community.
38
  
 
On the 15 of March 2006 European Parliament and European Council passed the Directive.
39
  
According to Article 1, the aim of the Directive was to harmonise member states provisions 
concerning the obligations of the providers of publicly available electronic communications 
services and of public communications networks in order to ensure that the specific type of data 
can in the future be used for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of 
serious crime.
40
  
                                                          
34
 The European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed April 2, 2020. 
35
 Elektronisko sakaru likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 183, 17.11.2004. Available on:  https://likumi.lv/ta/id/9661 1 
Accessed March 30, 2020. 
36
 The European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed April 2, 2020. 
37
 The European Parliament and of the European Council. Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. Available on: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj Acessed March 27, 2020.  
38
Kranenborg, Herke. "Protection of Personal Data." In The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, 
edited by Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward, p. 223–224. London: Hart Publishing, 2014. 
Accessed June 5, 2020. Available on: http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781849468350.ch-009. Accessed April 4, 2020.   
39
 The European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed Mach 21, 2020.  
40
The European Commission. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Evaluation 
report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC), Brussels. Available on: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0225:FIN:en:PDF. Accessed April 7, 2020.; The 
11 
 
 
The Directive was not the first legal tool that regulated electronic communications. Before 
Directive, the European Union established two directives that dealt with data retention. First 
directive was Directive 95/46/EC that was established on the 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data.
41
 This directive is no longer in force, because it was replaced by the Regulation 2016/679 
mostly known as The General Data Protection Regulation on the 25 May 2018.
42
 Second 
directive that was established by the European Parliament and the European Council was 
Directive 2002/58/EC
43
 that was established on the 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.
44
 This 
directive is still in force and can be seen as a successor of the Directive 95/46/EC.
45
  
 
Almost twenty years ago, the Directive was a tool to combat terrorism, because terrorist attacks 
in Europe during 2004 and 2005 proved that Europe is not ready to combat such a high level of 
crimes.
46
 The idea to trace terrorists using information from their phones and computers seemed 
like the best way how to make sure that terrorism attacks do not repeat itself.
47
 Comparing the 
use of phones and computers then and now, it can be concluded that people’s privacy was not 
violated as much as now. Back in the early 2000’s social media were not a large part of people’s 
life, not everybody used a computer or a mobile phone. Author agrees that the Directive, if it 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY     Accessed April 4, 2020. 
41
The European Parliament and European Council. Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!Xb76Xu. Accessed April 7, 2020 
42
 The European and European Council. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
Available on:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj Accessed March 25, 2020.  
43
 The European Parliament and the European Council. Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. Available on:  
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj Accessed March 26, 2020.  
44
Ibid.. 
45
 The European Parliament and of the European Council. The Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
Available on: https://europa.eu/!Xb76Xu. Accessed March 26, 2020. 
46
 Richard A Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
47
 Møller Pedersen, Anja, Udsen, Henrik and Sandfeld Jakobsen, Søren (2018). “Data retention 
In Europe—the Tele 2 case and beyond”. In: International Data Privacy Law p.160.; para 14(10) Available on: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0293 Accessed March 27, 2020.  
12 
 
would not be invalidated, could be used as a tool to combat crime, but there is some level of 
doubt that two decades ago terrorists carried their phones around with them. 
 
In the early years of the 21
st
 century, the Directive was seen as a unique tool for law 
enforcement, because it was a new way how to combat crime in a newly established technology 
world.
48
 According to Article 5 of the Directive
49
, it authorised states to have an access to a wide 
variety of information to be obtained and stored by the telecommunication’s providers. The 
Directive allowed to track almost all information regarding a call except the content of the call 
itself. Internet access providers also had the right to obtain a wide variety of information that 
established traffic data. All this information had to be stored and if needed, national and 
international authorities had the right to ask for this information. Since the information consisted 
of very personal information, the Directive did establish a level of protection for the obtained 
data. It was not easy to receive information about a person. In order to get access to the personal 
data for investigation purposes, police or other state security institutions had to ask a national 
court to grant them access to the needed information.
50
 This information circulated not only 
between the authorities of the state, but also the Directive also allowed to exchange the stored 
information between all member states.
51
   
  
Since terrorism and serious crime were a problem that one country could not battle alone, there 
was a need to create an identical way of gathering and storing data throughout the European 
Union.
52
 Since all member states had different laws that consisted of different rules, it was up to 
                                                          
48
 The European Commission.  Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlament. Evaluation 
report on the Data Retention Directive ( Directive 2006/24/EC), Brussels, 18.4.2011 COM(2011) 225 final. 
Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0225:FIN:en:PDF Accessed 
March 25, 2020. 
49
The European Parliament and European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/!dR36rY    Accessed April 2, 2020. 
50
 The European Union. Data protection and online privacy. Available on: 
https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/internet-telecoms/data-protection-online-privacy/index_en.htm 
Accessed April 2, 2020.   
51
 Konstadinides, Theodore. "Mass Surveillance and Data Protection in EU Law – the Data Retention Directive 
Saga." In European Police and Criminal Law Co-operation, edited by Maria Bergström and Anna Jonsson Cornell, 
69–84. London: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2014. Accessed June 5, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474201568.ch-
005. Accessed May 14, 2020. 
52
 The Directive 2006/24/EC, Article 1. Available, last visited 27.03.2020; Konstadinides, Theodore. "Mass 
Surveillance and Data Protection in EU Law – the Data Retention Directive Saga." In European Police and 
Criminal Law Co-operation, edited by Maria Bergström and Anna Jonsson Cornell, 69–84. London: Hart 
Publishing Ltd, 2014. Accessed June 5, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474201568.ch-005.  
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the Directive to harmonise data retention in the European Union.
53
 The vision was that the 
providers of publicly available electronic communications services and public communications 
would ensure that the stored data is available for the purpose of the prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of serious crime, such as organised crime and terrorism.  
 
Since the right to privacy existed long before any data protection regulation, upon the adoption 
of  the Directive, the question of possible burdens to the fundamental right to privacy was 
raised.
54
 During the adoption of the Directive, the European Parliament and the European 
Council concluded that the Directive was in compliance with the rights laid down in The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and with Article 7 and Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, thus no possible violation of the right to privacy were found.
55
 
After the Directive came into force, member states implemented it in their national laws of data 
retention or adopted a new law, using the Directive as a legal fundament. National laws and the 
Directive allowed legal national institutions to obtain information about person’s habits, friends, 
and family.
56
  
 
Legislators around Europe saw the Directive as a great tool to achieve greater security within the 
European Union. However, author sees this Directive as a mass surveillance tool.
57
 This 
Directive violated fundamental rights in the name of security, there is no doubt that restrictions 
can be made, but restrictions that the Directive puts over the rights to privacy and personal data 
                                                          
53
 Brownsword, Roger, Eloise Scotford, Karen Yeung, Mark Leiser, and Andrew Murray. "The Role of Non-State 
Actors and Institutions in the Governance of New and Emerging Digital Technologies." In The Oxford Handbook of 
Law, Regulation and Technology.: Oxford University Press, 2017-07-20. Available: 
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199680832.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199680832-e-
2 Accessed April 7, 2020 
54
 Konstadinides, Theodore. "Mass Surveillance and Data Protection in EU Law – the Data Retention Directive 
Saga." In European Police and Criminal Law Co-operation, edited by Maria Bergström and Anna Jonsson Cornell, 
69–84. London: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2014. Accessed June 5, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474201568.ch-
005. 
55
 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 8 April 2014. Joined Cases C‑ 293/12 and C‑ 594/12,para.24, 
Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0293 Accessed April 11, 
2020. 
56
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are also violating the essence of the whole existence of the European Union. The values of the 
European Union are human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law and human rights. 
Legal norms of the Directive breached all values of the European Union in the name of higher 
level of security within its borders and that is against the rules of democracy.
58
  
 
Member states of the European Union have multiple law sources, for example countries 
constitution, legislation, and judicial decisions that can be developed into case law.
59
 Despite the 
fact that member states have their own law and legal systems, none of the countries noticed any 
privacy infringements. The legal system, just as any other alive organism develops over time and 
grows. As the human rights grew, the Directive raised multiple questions about people’s right to 
privacy, because people started to see that their human rights to privacy and privacy standards 
were violated.  
1.1  Right to privacy and protection of personal data 
 
The right to privacy is a right to control who and how information regarding the individual is 
used. This fundamental human right is set out in multiple
60
 national and international human 
rights instruments. In this master thesis author will further focus on privacy that is regulated by 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
61
 and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
62
 
Data protection and the right to privacy are inseparable rights.
63
 However, they are not the same 
rights. Both rights are regulated by the Charter, but in theory they are two different freedoms.
64
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Yet, the legal issue that the Directive raised and that the Electronic Communication Law is 
raising, both freedoms cannot be separated.
65
  In modern society, the right to privacy is a right to 
choose what information one keeps to himself and what information a person wants to share with 
the public. It is fair to say that the right to privacy is a right to be left alone, but in reality this 
right is a lot more complex than that.
66
 Currently, international data protection rules are 
structured in a way that if ones data is collected, that person’s privacy is safeguarded.67 While the 
Directive was in force, the way how data was obtained and stored violated rights to privacy. In 
the second chapter of this thesis author will assess whether the same rights to private life and the 
right to data protection are breached by the Electronic Communications Law.   
 
The right to privacy and protection of personal data are vital in assuring every individual’s safety 
in the country they are living in. Governments are expected to protect individuals that are in their 
jurisdiction. That protection includes personal data protection.
68
 However, the reality shows that 
governments use their powers and violate rights to privacy. Privacy is a right that goes hand in 
hand with human dignity which is an absolute human right.
69
 Thus, privacy is not only an 
individual right but also a social value. 
The surveillance effect that the lack of privacy can create is affecting multiple fundamental 
rights, either directly or indirectly. This effect was made by the Directive and could potentially 
be created by the Electronic Communications Law, through an interference with privacy and data 
protection rights affecting the enjoyment or exercise of other fundamental rights. Aside from 
privacy and data protection rights, surveillance can constitute an interference with such classic 
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civil and political rights as freedom of movement, freedom of association and assembly, freedom 
of expression and other rights.
70
  
The digitalisation that has happened during the last 14 years shed a light to a need for higher 
level protection over personal life and data.
71
 By strengthening the protection of personal data, 
the right to privacy is strengthened too. The same analogy applies, if one right is violated, then 
the other is also disturbed. 
 
The right to privacy and data protection are important fundamental rights that are important for 
every person in the democratic society. Despite their importance,  those rights as established by 
international public law are not an absolute human rights.
72
 Both fundamental rights can be 
legitimately restricted by other overriding rights and they can also be illegitimately encroached 
upon, if the balancing test would conclude that the other conflicting right is more important. 
Greater cause usually is to safeguard other people’s rights from terror or a crime, but such 
interfere can happen, if it is allowed by the law. If law allows to breach fundamental right, then 
the State must prove a legitimate aim. A legitimate aim is considered to be the protection of other 
people’s rights, national security, public safety, prevention of crime and the protection of 
health.
73
 When the legitimate aim is established, authorities of the state must prove that there is a 
necessity in the democratic society for such acts.
74
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Under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms
75
, everyone has the right to respect for his private life and his 
correspondence. Public authorities may interfere with the exercise of that right only in 
accordance with the law and where necessary in a democratic society.
76
 
 
The Regulation (EU) 2016/679
77
 (further - General Data Protection Regulation) lays down rules 
for the protection of individuals regarding the processing of personal data and rules relating to 
the free movement of personal data. Moreover, the General Data Protection Regulation protects 
fundamental rights and freedoms of all people, especially their right to the protection of personal 
data.
78
The General Data Protection Regulation is the newest tool that is adopted with the aim to 
protect fundamental human rights, more specifically, the right to privacy. It established a new 
way in safeguarding personal data in this social media century. The General Data Protection 
Regulation also pointed out that the data that indirectly points to a person is also considered to be 
personal data that must be safeguarded and thus, it falls under the scope of this law.
79
  
 
Above mentioned proves that there is an active link between the legislation and the fundamental 
right to data protection.
80
  Article 16 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
established that “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them.”81  
 
Article 4 of the Directive’s preamble sets out restrictions that can be made, but only if all the 
conditions are met.
82
 According to the preamble, restrictions can be made to safeguard national 
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security, defence, public security or the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of 
criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communications systems.
83
 
The restriction test is well-established and can be found in both national and international public 
law.
84
 In order to restrict any right, states must prove that there is a necessity for the  restrictions, 
that they are appropriate and proportionate in the democratic society and that they are made for 
specific public order purposes. Such purposes have to be valid, they cannot be made for 
unimportant reasons.
85
 
 
It is important that the preamble sets out a norm that recognises fundamental rights and 
international public law principles that can be found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union
86
, because it reminds people that those are the basic rights that they have. Thus, 
creates a trust bond between an individual and the legislator. Further, the Directive clearly 
establishes that it is operating with respect and seeks to ensure full compliance with fundamental 
rights to respect for private life and communications and to the protection of personal data. 
 
While the wording of the Directive sounded promising, the joined cases C‑ 293/12 and 
C‑ 594/1287 showed that it takes much more than just a beautifully written preamble to prove 
and establish compliance with fundamental human rights.
88
 
1.2  The Judgement of Digital Rights Ireland 
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To compare the Directive and the Electronic Communications Law, it is important to look at the 
judgement that declares the Directive to be invalid. Further, this case is the most known case in 
the field of data retention even outside of the European Union, because the European Court of 
Justice tried to define the status of privacy and data protection rights in the legal system of the 
European Union, in the context of electronic surveillance, particularly the access to personal 
data.   
In 2006 the Irish civil rights group “Digital Rights Ireland” brought a claim against the Irish 
Government in order to find out whether the Directive and the Irish national laws are fair in the 
light of the right to privacy.
89
 The Digital Rights Ireland TJ Mcintyre publicly declared that “ 
[…] laws require telephone companies and internet service providers to spy on all customers, 
logging their movements, their telephone calls, their emails, and their internet access, and to 
store that information for up to three years. This information can then be accessed without any 
court order or other adequate safeguard. We believe that this is a breach of fundamental 
rights.”90 Not only the Digital Rights of Ireland raised a question on the validity of the 
Directive
91
, they also challenged the validity of national data retention law that was a part of the 
Irish Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act.
92
  
Meanwhile, in Austria the same question was raised by the Government of the Province of 
Carinthia and by Mr Seitlinger, Mr Tschohl and 11128 people who were eager to find out 
whether the Directive and the national data retention law are compatible with the Federal 
Constitutional Law (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz)
93
, because applicants were convinced that both, 
the Directive and national data retention law are breaching fundamental human rights.  
Only six years later, in 2012, the European Court of Justice received two requests for a 
preliminary ruling. One came from the High Court of Ireland and the other from the 
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Constitutional Court of Austria.
94
 Despite the fact that cases came from two different countries, 
they both raised the same vital concern that the Directive violated fundamental human rights.
95
 
The submitted questions by the parties could not be answered by the domestic courts, because 
national courts cannot evaluate whether the Directive is valid, therefor both questions were sent 
to the European Court of Justice. Since the addressed questions were identical in their essence, 
the European Court of Justice joined both cases together.  
Firstly, to settle the case, the European Court of Justice examined how and whether two older 
directives, the Directive 95/46/EC
96
 and the Directive 2002/58/EC safeguarded fundamental 
human rights to privacy. According to the findings
97
, fundamental rights were safeguarded by the 
Directive 95/46/EC Article 1 (1)
98
 and Article 17 (1)
99
. As for the Directive 2002/58/EC, the 
duty to safeguard fundamental rights was implemented in Article 1 (1)
100
 and Article 4
101
.
102
 
Thus, formally, the right to privacy was included in the Directive.  
Both cases raised several different questions, but to combine cases, the European Court of Justice 
reduced all submitted questions to one general question. The overarching question was whether 
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the Directive is valid in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the Charter of fundamental rights of 
the European Union.
103
  
To answer the question, firstly, the court tackled whether freedom of expression is breached by 
the Directive. During this research author was surprised that the European Court of Justice even 
focused on this right, because in my opinion it is clear, that there is no link between the Directive 
and freedom of expression.  
Freedom of expression is a right of each person to speak out opinions and share information in 
whatever form.
104
 The right to expression also forbids governmental authorities or other 
individuals to practice censorship.
105
 The core issue that the Directive upheld was not raising the 
issue of expression among people. The Directive allowed to store traffic and personal data such 
as caller ID and location, but such data have nothing to do with the right of expression. The 
European Court of Justice later in the case,  found that the Directive has an effect on the 
fundamental right to respect for private life and the fundamental right to the protection of 
personal data that is regulated with the Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of fundamental rights of 
the European Union. 
106
  
The European Court of Justice did not hesitate to point out that Article 3 and Article 5 of the 
Directive are problematic. If the information that is obtained according to the Directive, would 
be gathered about one individual, it would be possible to set out a map of everyday habits, home 
address, work address, it would provide information about individuals daily movements, the 
activities carried out, the social relationships of the individual and the social cycle that the person 
has.
107
  
Author finds that this is a turning point of the whole case, because findings showed, that the data 
obtained go further and deeper into person’s privacy than it is written in the Directive itself. 
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Subsequently, the wide roadmap of individual’s private life, was declared to be a direct breach of 
Articles 7
108
 and 8
109
 of the Charter.
110
  
The European Court of Justice used as   important argument, that in order to prove that the 
breach of fundamental rights to privacy exist, it does not matter whether the information about 
the person concerned is sensitive or whether the person concerned have been inconvenienced in 
any way. 
111
 Further, the European Court of Justice used a case law
112
 to prove that access of the 
competent national authorities to the data constitutes a breach of fundamental rights to privacy 
that are laid out in the Article 7 and Article 8
113
 of the Charter. 
114
 
Advocate General Cruz Villalon in his opinion commented on Article 7 and Article 8 of the 
Charter.
115
 The European Court of Justice
116
 aligned with his comments and where that the 
fundamental rights are widely breached and that the breach can be qualified as serious.
117
 
Suspicions of possible fundamental human rights violations existed, because the Directive 
allowed to obtain all kinds of data that was exposed to an unlimited number of persons for a long 
time. The Digital Ireland case developed and idea that the retention of data exclusively affects 
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those whose conduct in no way justifies the retention of data relating to them. The directive gives 
power to state actors to obtain almost unlimited information about people’s private lives and use 
the obtained data for multiple purposes, having regard in particular to the unquantifiable number 
of persons having access to the data for a minimum period of six months, but up to two years. 
Because of the broad description in the Directive, it established legal doubts whether it can 
achieve the objectives which it pursues and if the proportionality of the interference with the 
fundamental rights is established.
118
 
 
Before the European Court of Justice turned to the proportionality test, it stated that there is a 
ground to believe that the violation exists, because “[…] data relating to a person’s private life 
and to his communications, such as those referred to in Article 5 of the directive, constitutes in 
itself an interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter.”119  
 
To conclude whether the Directive is lawful, the European Court of Justice applied a structured 
proportionality test that is set out in Article 4 of the Directive
120
 and Article 52 of the Charter.
121
 
Even though the European Court of Justice and the Advocate General both concluded that the 
Directive is breaching the fundamental rights on a high level, it was not enough to announce the 
Directive invalid.  
 
Next step was to test whether the breach of fundamental human rights could be justified or not. 
The first question of the test was whether the breach of fundamental rights satisfies an objective 
of general interest.
122
The court concluded that while the aim of the Directive was to harmonise 
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data retention in the European Union, the material objective according to Article 1 (1) was to 
contribute to the fight against serious crime and thus, ultimately, to public security.
123
  
 
As mentioned before, state security is fundamental for everyone who is within the borders of a 
country. In the European Union, the neighbouring countries need to have sufficient security 
levels, so that everyone feels safe. The court also concluded that the fight against international 
terrorism in order to maintain international peace and security is considered to be a general 
interest of society.
124
  During its evaluation, the court highlighted that the use of electronic 
communications are particularly important and can be a valuable tool in the prevention of 
offences and the fight against organised crime and crime per se.
125
 Thus, despite all above 
mentioned fundamental rights violations, the Directive was seen as a great tool for crime 
combatting and subsequently it fully complies with the objective of general interest.
126
 
 
Further, to make sure that the breach of fundamental rights is lawful, the European Court of 
Justice had to evaluate whether the interference was absolutely necessary in the democratic 
society.
127
 Because the aim was fulfilled and the court saw the need to combat crime with new 
tools, it  held that the retention of data for the purpose of allowing the competent national 
authorities to have possible access to personal data, as required by Directive 2006/24, genuinely 
satisfies an objective of general interest.
128
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Even though the European Court of Justice found the Directive to be a great tool for crime 
combatting, it turned to test the proportionality of the restrictions caused by the Directive. In 
order to evaluate the proportionality, the European Court of Justice had to weigh whether acts of 
the governmental authorities are appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by 
the Directive and do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to 
achieve those objectives.
129
  
 
After close evaluation of the proportionality, the court concluded that crime combatting, 
especially fight against terrorism is indeed of the utmost importance in ensuring public security 
and its effectiveness may depend to a great extent on the use of modern investigation 
techniques.
130
 However, such an objective of general interest, however fundamental it may be, 
does not justify a retention measure such as that established by the Directive being considered to 
be necessary for the purpose of combatting crime.
131
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The proportionality test proved that so far as it concerns the right to respect for private life, the 
protection of that fundamental right requires, according to the European Court of Justice settled 
case-law, in any event, that derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of personal 
data must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.
132
 
 
This judgement showed how the European Court of Justice chose to look between the lines of the 
Directive, because while author was reading the Directive, it never accrued how broad the scope 
of the Directive is. According to the courts findings, Article 3 of the Directive when read 
together with Article 5 (1) covers all types of electronic communications and covers all 
subscribers and registered users.   Thus, it was concluded by the court that the Directive is 
interfering with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European Union’s population.133 
 
After the close examination, the European Court of Justice concluded that the scope of the 
Directive is too general, because according to the Directives rules, all persons and all means of 
electronic communication as well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or 
exception being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime.
134
 The 
Directive affects all people who are using electronic communications services, but without the 
persons whose data are retained being, even indirectly, in a situation which is liable to give rise 
to criminal prosecutions. It therefore applies even to persons for whom there is no evidence 
capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with 
serious crime. Furthermore, it does not provide for any exception, with the result that it applies 
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even to persons whose communications are subject, according to rules of national law, to the 
obligation of professional secrecy.
135
 
 
Directive 2006/24 does not lay down any objective criterion by which the number of persons 
authorised to access and subsequently use the data retained is limited to what is strictly necessary 
in the light of the objective pursued. Above all, the access by the competent national authorities 
to the data retained is not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an 
independent administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to 
what is strictly necessary. For the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and which 
intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted within the framework of 
procedures of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions. Nor does it lay down a specific 
obligation on Member States designed to establish such limits.
136
 
 
The lack of causal link between the data whose retention is provided for and a threat to public 
security, is not restricted to a retention in relation to data pertaining to a particular time period 
and/or a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular persons likely to be 
involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or to persons who could, for other reasons, 
contribute, by the retention of their data, to the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious 
offences.
137
 
 
The Directive practically, suspected each person of Europe to be a criminal, because according to 
the findings of the European Court of Justice, everyone who is using any type of device for 
communication could be a potential criminal. Further, the Directive does not require any link 
between the data whose retention is provided for and a threat to public security. 
138
  
 
The court discovered that another flaw of the Directive was that there were no limits to who can 
access to the data. The objective criteria by which to determine the limits of the access of the 
                                                          
135
 The European Court of Justice. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, Para 58. Available on: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0293   Accessed on May 9, 2020 
136
 Ibid para. 62. 
137
 Ibid. para 59. 
138
 Ibid para 57. 
28 
 
competent national authorities to the data and their subsequent use for the purposes of 
prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions concern offences that, in view of the extent and 
seriousness of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, may be considered to be sufficiently serious to justify such an interference. On the 
contrary, the Directive simply refers, in Article 1(1), in a general manner to serious crime, as 
defined by each Member State in its national law.
139
  
 
The Directive does not mention any substantive and procedural conditions relating to the access 
of the competent national authorities to the data and to their subsequent use. Article 4
140
 of the 
Directive, which governs the access of those authorities to the data retained, does not expressly 
provide that that access and the subsequent use of the data in question must be strictly restricted 
to the purpose of preventing and detecting precisely defined serious offences or of conducting 
criminal prosecutions relating thereto; it merely provides that each Member State is to define the 
procedures to be followed and the conditions to be fulfilled in order to gain access to the retained 
data in accordance with necessity and proportionality requirements.
141
   
 
Further, the Directive
142
 is lacking a norm that would specify how many people are authorised to 
access and subsequently use the data retained is limited to what is strictly necessary in the light 
of the objective pursued. Above all, the access by the competent national authorities to the data 
retained is not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an independent 
administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is 
strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and which intervenes 
following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted within the framework of procedures 
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of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions. Nor does it lay down a specific obligation on 
Member States designed to establish such limits.
143
 
 
Another argument why the Directive lost its validity was due to the length of the period in which 
one was allowed to store data. Article 6 of the Directive
144
 established a time limit from six 
months to a maximum of 24 months. Yet there was nothing written on when or what kind of data 
must be stored for period of time. The storage timeframe gave no objective criteria to ensure that 
it is limited to what is strictly necessary.
145
 
The grave uncertainty of how to properly care for the obtained data was the last proof that was 
needed to declare that the Directive entails a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference 
with those fundamental rights in the legal order of the European Union, without such an 
interference being precisely circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to 
what is strictly necessary.
146
 
 
All of the court findings proved that the protection of data retained by providers of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks did not 
provide for sufficient safeguards, as required by Article 8 of the Charter, to ensure effective 
protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and against any unlawful access and use 
of that data. Moreover,  Article 7 of the Directive had no rules which were specific and adapted 
to the vast quantity of data whose retention is required by that directive, the sensitive nature of 
that data and the risk of unlawful access to that data. These rules would serve, in particular, to 
govern the protection and security of the data in question in a clear and strict manner in order to 
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ensure their full integrity and confidentiality. Furthermore, a specific obligation on Member 
States to establish such rules has also not been laid down.
147
 
 
The court found that the Directive did not set out limits for retained data sharing. While the 
Directive regulated data that had to be stored and obtained within the European Union, there 
were no restrictions for sending this data outside of the Europe.  Because of that, the control, 
explicitly required by Article 8 (3) of the Charter
148
, cannot be fulfilled by an independent 
authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security. Sufficient control, 
carried out accordingly to the  European Union law, is an essential component of the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.
149
 Having regard to all the 
foregoing considerations, the European Court of Justice concluded that upon the adoption of the 
Directive, legislators have exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of 
proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter.
150
 
 
The European Court of Justice declared that the Directive is lacking clear and precise rules that 
would govern the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter. Despite how great of a tool the Directive seemed to be, the interferences 
with fundamental rights were not justified. 
The final judgement of the European Court of Justice
151
 reminded Europe that fundamental 
human rights are the most important rights of all. It is important to note that while the judgement 
                                                          
147
 The European Court of Justice. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, Para 66. Available on: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0293  Accessed on May 9, 2020 
148
 The European Parliament. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 7. Available on:  
http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2012/oj  Accessed March 15, 2020. 
149
 The European Court of Justice. Case C‑ 614/10 Commission v Austria EU:C:2012:631, paragraph 37. Available 
on:http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=128563&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=ls
t&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4660191 Accessed on April 17, 2020.; European Court of Justice. Digital Rights 
Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner 
Landesregierung and Others, para. 68. Available on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0293  Accessed on April 12, 2020. The European Parliament and 
European Council. Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. Available on: https://europa.eu/!dR36rY   Accessed April 
2, 2020.  
150
 European Court of Justice. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural 
Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, para. 69. Available on: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62012CJ0293  Accessed on May 12, 2020. 
151
 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 54/14. Luxembourg, 8 April 2014. Available on: 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf Accessed on April 16, 2020.;  
31 
 
was vital for this directive, it was not the first time that the arguments presented by the court 
came to light. Debates of whether the Directive is in line with the fundamental human rights 
started before the Directive was adopted.
152
 In 2002 a Working Party that worked on previous 
data directives had sufficient doubts about the Directives legality due to the fact that it is so 
broad.
153
The Working Party claimed that terrorism was indeed a standing problem, but 
governments of the European Union should find a solution that does not ask to trade citizens’ 
rights to live in peace and security in exchange for individual human right to data privacy, that is 
considered a cornerstone of modern democratic society.
154
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2. Electronic Communications Law 
 
In the previous chapter author concluded that the Directive had two purposes. One was to 
harmonise data retention across the European Union and the other one was to combat crime in a 
modern way. In order to harmonise data retention, the Directive ordered member states to issue 
national law that obliged Internet access and telecommunications providers to obtain records of 
their user activity, as well as to keep all recorded data for up to two years, and provide access to 
stored data to the police and security services.
155
  
Back on April 15, 2004 the Cabinet of Ministers issued the Electronic Communications Law 
according to the procedure of Article 81 of the Constitution on the 28
th
 October of 2004, 
Saeima
156
 adopted the Latvian Electronic Communications Law
157
 that entered into force on the 
1st of December 2004.
158
 While the Electronic Communications Law was established prior to the 
Directive, legal norms included in this national law are arising from the Directive.
159
 Articles 
were transposed from the Directive after it came in to force.  
According to the Saeimas verbatim
160
 report back in 2006 when the Directive came into force, 
the Electronic Communications Law was amended and during the amendment social impact 
assessment was applied to it. The test was used to see whether newly established norms have any 
impact on the society. The results of the impact assessment concluded that there was no impact 
on the society and that those norms could be transposed into the Electronic Communications 
Law.
161
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The author would argue that the impact assessment was not applied in a proper way. The 
assessment only focused on the crime combatting, thus legislator tested the law only from one 
side. The Directive truly gave a unique tool for crime combatting, but that is not a justification 
for not evaluating the burden put upon the fundamental human rights. If the impact assessment 
would be applied correctly, then it would prove that existing legal norms are seriously affected, 
especially one fundamental human right.  
The Electronic Communications Law consists of eight purposes. The first three purposes are 
regarding the electronic communications networks’ development162, next three purposes are 
about ensuring effective use of resources and protection of the State, providers, and users of 
electronic communications. The last three purposes are to protect personal data and ensure 
electronic communications services.
163
 From all purposes, the purpose to ensure the protection of 
the interests of the State, users and electronic communications merchants
164
 and the protection of 
user data, including personal data are in my view the most important ones.
165
 They are the most 
important, because they are ensuring the right to privacy. 
Despite the purposes of the Electronic Communications law, Annex 1 lays out several type of 
personal data that is allowed and must be retained by electronic communications services. They 
can obtain a telephone number that a person is calling to, the caller’s name, surname, the name of 
the entity and its address. As well as the given name, surname or designation and address of the 
registered user called, and given name, surname or designation and address of the user to which 
the call is routed in the case of call forwarding.
166
 That is already a huge amount of information, 
but it is also allowed to access data concerning how long person is speaking and data identifying 
the geographic location of each mobile communications network cell by reference to their 
location labels during the period for which communications data are retained. 
Just like the Directive, internet access providers are also allowed to obtain a large amount of 
personal data. They have access to users name, surname, designation and address of the 
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subscriber or registered user to whom an Internet Protocol address, user ID or telephone number 
was allocated at the time of the connection.
167
 If a person is using internet to call someone, the 
provider is allowed to obtain both phone numbers and information about both sides. Lastly, 
providers save information of time and date when a person logged in, logged off, sent an e-mail, 
or made a voice call.
168
  
All the above mentioned personal data can be used for investigations lead by police, security 
agents or the Financial and Market Capital Commission (further - FKTK)
169
. FKTK is allowed to 
use data in order to perform the supervision specified in the laws and regulations in the field of 
protection of the collective interests of consumers and circulation of information society 
services, the Consumer Rights Protection Centre has the right to request.
170
   
Further, personal data for example, of location can be obtained and transferred to pre-trial 
investigation institutions, bodies performing operational activities, state security institutions, the 
Prosecution Office and the court in order to protect the state and public security or to ensure the 
investigation of criminal offences, criminal prosecution and criminal court proceedings, as well 
as to the Competition Council for investigating violations of competition law which manifests as 
restrictive agreements. 
171
 
Information of person’s name, surname, personal identity number or name, registration number, 
address, user ID, telephone number and location of such subscriber or registered user to whom 
Internet protocol address has been assigned during the connection has to be stored and 
transferred to the State Police to ensure the protection of the rights and legal interests of the 
persons offended in the electronic environment within cases regarding the physical and 
emotional abuse of a child.
172
 All information can be obtained only if the court gives its 
permission.
173
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Data that can be obtained by multiple state institutions for mostly investigation purposes is 
sensitive and if it would be leaked it would incredibly harmful to individuals and they would 
have a standing case to bring before the court for privacy infringements.    
From what I have learned during my studies, I can see that from the perspective of European 
Union law and Public International law, the Electronic Communications Law is raising multiple 
privacy issues and could cause more if internet access provider servers would be hacked or if the 
electronic communications operators would face cyberattacks. Yet that is not enough to prove 
that the Electronic Communications Law is unlawful. In order to prove that this law is breaching 
a person’s right to privacy an individual would have to go to court.  
Currently, there is no national case, nor a study nor a publication that touches upon privacy 
issues that this law portraits. Does that mean that Latvian citizens have no problem with the fact 
that their rights to privacy are breached every day? Privacy is more than just a right to have a 
personal space at home. Privacy is a right of the individual that allows a person’s free and 
uninterrupted participation in public affairs and the free use of other fundamental rights. Thus 
privacy can be used as a condition for the sole existence of a constitutional democracy.  
Further in this chapter author will test whether the Latvian legislator is actively breaching rights 
to privacy of its citizens. Author raised this question, because the lack of awareness of this 
problem almost creates an illusion that the whole country somehow forgot about this law. Yet, 
that is not the case, because the law was amended in February 2020 and the use of it was 
widened in March 2020, but author will focus on the March amendments in the next chapter.  
Since there are no publications regarding the fact that the Electronic Communications Law 
consists of norms that are directly taken from a Directive that seriously breached fundamental 
human rights, author is  writing this master thesis in order to raise an awareness and to start a 
discussion among other professionals and the general public. It is important to raise awareness 
within the general public, because if the legislator will not announce the Electronic 
Communications Law unjust and invalid, there will be an urgent need to bring a case to the 
Constitutional court of Latvia, because it is the only court that can and arguably would announce 
that the existing law is not lawful.  
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In order to hear other opinions about the issue at hand, author have sent e-mails to the Data State 
Inspectorate
174
 of Latvia and to the Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Latvia
175
. Author 
wanted to find out their view and their arguments on whether they find that the Electronic 
Communications Law is causing a burden on Latvian citizen’s fundamental rights. To both 
institutions, author sent three questions. Firstly, whether it is allowed for telecommunications 
operators to give out retained data to medical personnel in order to combat the spread of COVID-
19, knowing that the decision to give out private data is made without a consent of a judge? 
Secondly, author asked whether the research
176
 by the University of Latvia and the SIA “Latvijas 
Mobilais Telefons” was concluded using the data that is specified in the Electronic 
Communications Law? If so, does the Data State Inspectorate see any violations of human rights, 
knowing that the Electronic Communications Law has no legal norm that would allow to use 
personal data for research purposes? Thirdly, author asked whether the Electronic 
Communications Law is violating Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While the 
questions author submitted were identical, the answers and the approach towards the questions 
were different. 
The Data State Inspectorate (further – the Inspectorate) submitted the following answers177- 
firstly, the Inspectorate admitted that the data that consists of persons telephone number is a 
significant part of private life, thus giving this information out to any third party would constitute 
a breach of Latvian Constitution Article 96
178
 and Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
179
 Yet, as author expected prior to sending the question, the Inspectorate used the 
most universal argument - that the violation of human rights is justifiable if such acts are 
necessary for the achievement of a legitimate aim in a democratic society and is proportionate to 
its aim. In order to prove that their argument is valid, the Inspectorate used case law of the 
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Constitutional Court of Latvia,
180
 where the court has assessed whether a restriction of an 
individual's rights is justified.
181
 The next argument presented by the Inspectorate was that 
according to the General Data Protection Regulation
182
 if at least one point of the Article 6 (1) 
can be fulfilled, the use of data is lawful.  
The answer and argument for the second question was divided in two parts. Firstly, the 
Inspectorate explained that according to the Article 71 of the Electronic Communications Law, 
emergency medical service has the right to have access to personal location data. Further, they 
listed all institutions that also have access to personal data. Secondly, they pointed out that 
according to  Article 33 of the “On the Operation of State Authorities During the Emergency 
Situation Related to the Spread of COVID-19” 183 upon the request from the Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control, the State Police has to provide the necessary personal information – 
location and the telephone number. Such information can be claimed only if the person is 
identified as a contact person for a person infected with Covid-19 or a person with a laboratory 
confirmed diagnosis of Covid-19. The State Police must transfer the data received from the 
electronic communications merchant to the Centre for Disease Prevention and Control for the 
performance of an epidemiological investigation. Thus, Data State Inspectorate concluded that 
the legal norm is not breaching fundamental human rights, because the grounds for the access to 
data can be found in  Article 6 (1) (C) of the General Data Protection Regulation – processing is 
necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject 
184
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Thirdly, to the last question, the Inspectorate argued that the research done by SIA “Latvijas 
Mobilais Telefons” and the University of Latvia does not show any sign of violation, but they 
also admitted that also have no information that actual personal data is used in this research. 
However, they turned to Article 71 of the Electronic Communications Law, that would allow 
such usage of data, if it would be done, because according to Article 71 (2)
185
: the processing of 
location data for other purposes without the consent of a user or subscriber shall be permitted 
only in such cases if the user or subscriber cannot be identified using such location data. Since 
the location data cannot be used to identify people, such usage is allowed.  
The last question, whether the Electronic Communications Law is or is not violating fundamental 
human rights, was not answered, because the evaluation of validity is outside of its competence. 
Further, the Inspectorate stated that according to Article 16 of the Constitutional Court Law
186
, 
the Constitutional Court hears cases regarding the compliance of other regulatory enactments or 
parts thereof, with legal norms (acts) of higher legal force. The same applies to the law "On the 
activities of state institutions during an emergency situation related to the spread of Covid-19".  
The ministry of Transport used a different approach to the questions author submitted. They 
answered all three questions using the reference to the second question. Author was surprised 
that all those questions were approached the same way, considering that this answer was signed 
by the Secretary of State.  
The answer to the first question was that according to Article 33 of on the Operation of State 
Authorities during the Emergency Situation Related to the Spread of COVID-19
187
 law, the 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control has a legal right to obtain location data and telephone 
number for epidemiological investigations. Unlike the Inspectorate who used Article 71
188
 to 
prove that personal data is allowed to be used in case of investigation, the Ministry of Transport 
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found the legal base for argument in the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 820.
189
 The 
essence of this argument is that the Centre for Disease Prevention and Control can obtain as 
much personal data as needed to fulfil its duties. Subsequently, since the legal norms allow to 
access such intervention, it is legal. 
To the answer second question, the Ministry of Transport reached out to the University of Latvia 
and SIA “Latvijas Mobilais Telefons” and found out that the research was based on mobile 
network event statistics. Unfortunately, there is no such term in the Electronic Communications 
Law. The Ministry of Transport also used a term “general data”. Author tried to find a meaning 
of above-mentioned terms in the Electronic Communications Law and found out that those terms 
do not exist. 
Yet, the Ministry of Transport claimed that the level of data used in this research contains only 
general information that cannot identify the end user. Here, author would like to point out that 
the Directive also allowed to access general data, yet the European Court of Justice declared that 
the “ general data” can pinpoint to a specific person, show people’s habits and provide 
institutions with other data that, if put together can identify a person. The answer to the second 
question ended with a remark that the data used in this research is not regulated by the Electronic 
Communications Law, thus there is no violation towards use of personal data.  
It is hard to believe that the last remark is true, because according to the information that is 
published by SIA “Latvijas Mobilais Telefons” , they used the location data that is regulated by 
the Electronic Communications Law. Otherwise, they could not reach two conclusions. Firstly, 
they concluded that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, people have returned to Latvia. 
Secondly, they wrote that “According to the data, the activity has moved from city and work 
centres to the residential area and rural area.”190 Further, they named multiple cities where higher 
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activity than usual has been detected. The fact that a research can detect movement proves that in 
this research location data has been used. Moreover, President of LMT prof. Juris Binde made a 
statement that “[…] Secondly our data shows that all regions of Latvia comply with the 
requirement to stay home. At the same time, there are places where it is important to ensure that 
people do not violate the social distancing.” 191 
Lastly, this research concluded that according to the results ever since the state of emergency in 
the country was declared, both on weekdays and on weekends, the activity of people in certain 
places has rapidly increased - including in Jūrmala and Salacgrīva, where the number of visitors 
at other times of the year is quite small. 
According to the information about the research author have concluded that there are two 
possible scenarios regarding the usage of data. Either this research is fake, or it is based on 
location data. To me it looks like they have used the location data, because at the end of the Press 
Release they have put a disclaimer that this research is conducted in accordance with the General 
Data Protection Regulation, but at the same time it allows to accurately assess the behaviour of 
the residents, as well as the location, movement and time of a particular activity.
192
 
According to the General Data Protection Regulation
193, “[…] processing includes ‘profiling’ 
that consists of any form of automated processing of personal data evaluating the personal 
aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning the 
data subject's (…) behaviour, location or movements, where it produces legal effects concerning 
him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”194 Since the research used personal data 
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that included analysis of location and movements, this research is not held in accordance with the 
General Data Protection Regulation and it is breaching rights to privacy. Further, the usage of 
data is regulated with the Electronic Communications Law, even though the Ministry of 
Transport claimed otherwise.  
The location data
195
 is regulated by the Electronic Communications Law. Since the research used 
location information that is classifiable as personal data, with this research electronic 
communications merchant SIA “Latvijas Mobilais Telefons” has shared personal data with a 
third party – the University of Latvia. According to Article 71 (4) of the Electronic 
Communications Law, electronic communications merchant had to ask for persmission to ask if 
it could be transferred to third persons. In this case, SIA “Latvijas Monilais Telefons” illegally 
shared personal data for public research with a third party. Author find this to be a grave 
violation of  personal data protection right. Thus, cannot agree with the ministry of Transport 
that this research is not violating human rights, because the usage of personal data for a public 
research that is conducted in collaboration with a third party without consent of the individual is 
highlighting that there are human right violations.   
Since the Ministry of Transport focused only on the research, as soon as author received their 
answer, author sent another e-mail to them, to point out that they have not answered to the 
submitted questions per se.
196
The Ministry of Transport did not deliver the second answer within 
the legal time frame
197
.   
Both institutions claimed the same argument – violation of right to privacy is justifiable because 
such a violation is needed in order to maintain the highest possible level of state security, 
especially in times of a global pandemic. Author agrees with the fact that it is important, but the 
Electronic Communications Law is not the best tool to combat crime or a pandemic, since it is 
not even the aim of this law. Further, there is no link between a need to safeguard national 
security and the need to give out a broad spectrum of personal data to so many national and 
international institutions. The Directive prior to its invalidation provided national institutions 
with the same amount of information as the Electronic Communications Law. The European 
                                                          
195
 Latvijas Vēstnesis,  Elektronisko sakaru likums, 1.panta piektā daļa, 1.un 2. pielikums. 183, 17.11.2004. 
Available on https://likumi.lv/ta/id/96611  Accessed April 5, 2020.  
196
On the May 29, 2020. 
197
 Saeima. Iesniegumu likums, 5. Panta trešā daļa. Available on: https://m.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=164501 Accessed 
May 12, 2020. 
42 
 
Court of Justice claimed that this information, taken as a whole can provide authorities with a 
wide spectrum of personal information. The European Court of Justice concluded that the 
interference with private life of individuals cannot be justified. Since the Directive and the 
Electronic Communications Law are similar, therefor, the Electronic Communications Law is 
breaching fundamental rights.  
Author believes that there is a standing case that needs to be brought to the court, because the 
Electronic Communications Law is directly breaching Article 8
198
 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights that safeguards a person’s right to private life.199 In this chapter author will try 
to prove that the Electronic Communications Law is breaching human rights. Subsequently, if 
the breach will be proven successfully, author will test whether this breach is justifiable.  
According to Public International Law and human rights, countries are allowed to interfere with 
human right due to public safety, national security and other crime related and important 
reasons.
200
 In order to find out whether the plausible breach caused by national law is justifiable, 
it is necessary to test whether the breach satisfies the following criteria. In order to justify any 
limitations on human right, restrictions have to be in accordance with the law or prescribed by 
law and all restriction must be necessary in a democratic society.  
To find out the necessity in a democratic society, author  would have to turn to the European 
Court of Justice that often has to balance the people’s interests that are protected by Article 8 and 
the member states’ interests protected by other provisions of the convention and its protocols. In 
the next paragraphs author will analyse the plausible breach with the same test that the Latvian 
constitutional court would have to use if they were to deal with a case like this. 
Firstly, the court would test, whether the law was adopted properly, in accordance with existing 
legal norms. The Electronic Communications Law was adopted in the correct time frame and 
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was published in the official publisher of the Republic of Latvia, Latvijas Vēstnesis, thus there is 
no reason to doubt that the law was enacted with any procedural errors.
201
  
Secondly, the Constitutional court would test whether the restrictions have a legitimate aim.
202
 
According to the Electronic Communications Law, all data, including traffic data that is obtained 
and stored by electronic communications providers and public internet service providers per se 
falls within the scope of Article 8.
203
  
The reason why the state needs to have access to personal electronic data is to use it for case 
solving that involve organised crime groups, terrorism, and other state security related cases. 
According to the European Court of Justice, when a case is concerning terrorists, the States enjoy 
a wider margin of appreciation, especially with especially regarding the storage of information of 
individuals implicated in past terrorist activities.
204
  
The European Court of Justice has found that it falls within the legitimate bounds of the process 
of investigation of terrorist crime for the competent authorities to record and retain basic 
personal details concerning the arrested person or even other persons present at the time and 
place of arrest.
205
 In terrorism investigation cases it is proven that data retention is working, 
because a state can get a hold of person’s data and use that collected data to safeguard society as 
a whole and maintain peace. There is no doubt that a breach of terrorist’s or criminal’s right to 
privacy is a smaller loss than a possibility to safeguard people’s lives that would be harmed by 
the person who is being tracked by the state authorities.   
Yet, the Electronic Communications law is not adopted for purely terrorism combatting 
purposes. This law allows to obtain data and use it for investigations, but it can also be used in a 
way that is without a necessity breaching people’s right to privacy. For example, the law itself 
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allows to use data for solving cases of misdemeanours. There is no doubt, that this law helps to 
combat serious crimes and it is only a great tendency that police and other security agents are 
willing to use technology to combat crime. Author finds that existing consequences are too 
serious despite how great of a tool it is for the state. Thus, author would conclude that the 
legitimate aim exists, but the existing regulation is too broad, because obtained data can be used 
for all kinds of investigations.
206
 
It is unacceptable to breach human rights for lower level crime investigations because human 
rights violations are proportionally causing more harm than misdemeanours. If the law would 
allow to use personal data strictly for terrorism combatting, then it would be appropriate, but 
while this is not the case, author finds this law to be too broad and therefor unlawful. 
Furthermore, while the legislator did not hesitate to set out nine purposes of the law, none of 
them mention that the aim is to combat crime.
207
  
Thirdly, the court should conclude that, the Electronic Communications Law does not reach the 
necessity mark, since the human rights serve a greater importance in this particular 
situation.
208
Data retention is a modern tool, but this tool is used in a harmful matter. Currently, 
Latvia is using techniques that the European Court of Justice has found to be unacceptably 
weakening towards Article 8 of the Convention, because the existing regulation is allowing to 
obtain data without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such 
techniques against important private-life interests.
209
 
In a democratic society, the fact that the existing legislation that allows to screen its citizens in 
such a broad way using communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the 
legislation may be applied.
210
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Surely, there is an argument to be made that the domestic legislator and national authorities can, 
to a certain degree, assess what system of surveillance is required, but this power is not unlimited 
for countries with a democratic society. Powers of secret surveillance of citizens are tolerable 
only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic society.
211
 Interferences that 
the Electronic Communications law allows must be supported by relevant and sufficient reasons 
and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims pursued.
212
 
If the law, as it in the case with the Electronic Communications Law, does not clearly indicate 
the scope and aim of the discretion conferred to the domestic authorities to obtain and store in a 
surveillance database information on person’s private life, in particular, where it does not set out 
in a form accessible to the public any indication of the minimum safeguards against abuse, that 
amounts to an interference with private life as protected by Article 8 of the Convention.
213
 
National law must provide sufficiently precise, effective and comprehensive safeguards on the 
ordering, execution and potential redressing of surveillance measures. Accordingly, the amount 
of privacy breach that the Electronic Communications Law is causing, could only be expectable 
if the need for the interference to be necessary in a democratic society would be interpreted as 
requirement that any restriction on person’s rights are strictly necessary both, as a general 
consideration, to safeguard democratic institutions and, as a particular consideration, to obtain 
essential intelligence in an individual operation. If the restriction does not fulfil the criteria, state 
cannot issue any restrictions towards person’s right to privacy.214 To avoid stepping over an 
individual’s right to privacy, data retention rules have to have clear and detailed rules, especially 
as the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated.
215
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No doubt that personal privacy is just as important as national security, because simultaneously 
national security is ensuring a person’s security. It is important to point out that access to traffic 
data is useful and needed for combatting crime, however it is just as important to draw a line to 
how far countries can go when breaching privacy, keeping in mind that the rights that are at stake 
are fundamental rights to privacy.
216
 
States are allowed to alter people’s rights when balancing their interest in protecting national 
security through data retention measures against the seriousness of the interference with a 
person’s right to respect for his or her private life. The national authorities enjoy a certain margin 
of appreciation in choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national 
security. However, there must be adequate and effective safeguards against abuse of rights. In 
cases when the European Court of Justice has to weigh out states actions it has to take into 
account the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of measures.
217
 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights is not the only international law article 
that the Electronic Communications is violating. Article 7 of the Charter of fundamental rights of 
the European Union
218
 has also been breached. Exactly the same violation of Article 7 was found 
in the cases Schrems
219
 and Digital Rights
220
.  
Author must admit, that despite the fact that Electronic Communications Law is violating human 
rights, the scheme that is used with this law is truly genius. Back in 2014 the Riga municipality 
proclaimed Riga to be the European Capital of Wi-Fi”, because the municipality did a large 
project with the national telecommunications company “Lattelecom” that resulted in placing 
more than 4,000 free Wi-Fi points all around Riga.
221
 In the past six years the count of public 
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internet points has grown not only in Riga, but all across Latvia. People think that they are 
getting access to internet for free, but in reality, there are paying a very high price for it. People 
are giving away their identities and other vital information to the state authorities. This price way 
too high for a brief moment online.  
There will be some, who will claim, that Google and other platforms like Twitter and Facebook 
are also doing the same thing and that is causing a bigger threat than what the national authorities 
do. It is important to point out that when human rights are at stake, there should not be a question 
of who is causing a bigger violation by their wrongful acts, because such acts are against 
people’s rights to freedom, security and justice in the democratic country.222  
Proof that governments are using data retention laws like the Electronic Communications Law 
can be found in the Google Transparency Record. Using this data base, everyone can find out 
how many times a government has filed a claim to gain access to personal data of its citizens.
223
 
The Government of Latvia have asked to have access to personal data of a few people and 
mostly received a decline. This fact also proves that Latvia mostly has no lawful reason to access 
data.
224
 
2.1  New approach to the Electronic Communications Law 
 
Another question that has to be considered is the aspect of national security and how broadly the 
Electronic Communications law can be used. On March 29, 2020 State Chancellery of Latvian 
Republic issued a statement that in order to control spread of the COVID-19 and for the purposes 
of conducting an epidemiological investigation and verifying the veracity of information on 
movement provided by a person and upon the request of the Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, the State Police will have the right to request information from electronic 
communications operators on specific persons who may have a status of the infected person or 
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contact person.
225
 In my humble opinion there are other ways to tackle the problem and there is 
no need to widen the Electronic Communications law even more.
226
 
As author have mentioned before, state security usually is the argument that countries are putting 
forward when they try to get excused for breaching human rights. As we all know by now, 
COVID-19 has caused a worldwide pandemic and countries are not only shutting down their 
boarders, but countries are also coming up with multiple new emergency laws in order to 
eliminate the spread of COVID-19. Latvia found a new way to make sure that COVID-19 is not 
spreading. The solution is simple, now there is no regulation on what grounds the Centre for 
Disease Prevention can ask for data. According to Grozījumi Ministru kabineta 2020. gada 12. 
marta rīkojumā Nr. 103 "Par ārkārtējās situācijas izsludināšanu" 227 they are allowed to ask for 
personal data if they have any suspicion that a person is breaching isolation rules or the person 
could harm others because he is ill with the virus. Rights to the medical personnel are given in 
order to safeguard national security and wellbeing. As mentioned before, in order to justify any 
compulsory and general data retention must be clearly demonstrated with evidence that is clear 
and raise no doubts.
228
 The current situation allows to obtain data purely on doubts and fear and 
that is damaging the national legal system. 
The existing legal framework without adequate safeguards of person’s rights to privacy is also 
harming the European Union’s legal framework.229The current national law is harmful, because 
freedom in all forms of communications is a dominant piece of modern society as a whole and 
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the fundament of the European Union.
230
 The right to privacy is set out in multiple European 
Union legislations and international law norms. It is included in all international human rights 
instruments and privacy has been recognised as an important right by courts all around the globe. 
It can be concluded that the right to privacy is part of customary international law.
231
 
The European Court of Human Rights has pointed out that secret surveillance poses a danger to 
democratic society or it might destroy democracy and that States may not, as a tool against 
terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem appropriate.
232
 This statement can be applied in a 
situation of combatting a pandemic virus, because in both situations national security is at stake. 
The Latvian legislator is treating obtained data as meaningless factual information, but in reality 
personal information that is allowed to obtain by law, is reflecting an identity of a person. This 
information is a key to get an exclusive glimpse of human life.
233
 
The use of electronic communications data for combatting virus spread is unproportioned. 
Constitutional courts as well as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice use the proportionality principle as a tool to safeguard fundamental human rights from 
acts by member states.
234
 Proportionality principle requires for a state to put limitations on other 
rights according to the purpose and needs in the democratic society. It is a tool to weigh out the 
rationality of restrictions.
235
The proportionality is a complex principle, because it consists of 
adequacy, necessity and proportionality stricto senus.
236
 In order to prove that the new state 
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emergency regulation towards the Electronic Communications Law is unproportioned, I will 
apply the proportionality principle.  
First sub-principle is adequacy. It establishes that the law or a legal norm that is breaching 
human rights must achieve its purpose. Question here is whether it is possible to limit the spread 
of COVID-19 by tracking individuals’ location. The first successful use of location data was 
reported on 10
th
 of April, 2020.
237
 According to the information published on the State Police 
website, a person who was COVID-19 positive left the house, despite the restrictions and 
obligation to self-quarantine. The person had to pay a fine of 2000 euro for breaching the law. It 
is the first reported case where the use of data was successful, so there is a proof that the use of 
the Electronic Communications Law can limit the movement of persons who are registered as 
virus positive. Yet, after paying the fine, it is likely that the individual will stay home. It is just as 
likely that this individual will leave his or her phone at home or will buy a pre-payed mobile 
card. In that way individual can no longer be tracked. I would argue that the aim can only be 
reached partially, thus new regulation is not adequate.     
Second sub-principle is necessity which can be establish only, if the legislator has decided to use 
a restriction tool that is the least restrictive on human rights.
238
 There are multiple privacy issues 
with the COVID-19 regulation, because it has many loop holes and uncertainties.  
Latvia is not the first country who decided to track people by using their mobile or internet 
traffic data.
239
  At first tracking started in Asia. The countries that suffered the most in Europe 
also took this idea and implemented it. Countries, including Latvia are using all means that they 
can come up with to fight this virus. There is a great need to combat COVID-19, but states have 
to remember no to step on fundamental rights unless it is the only means available to reach the 
aim. 
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The Electronic Frontier Foundation
240
 (further – the Frontier) has published its findings on the 
location surveillance. The Frontier strongly opposes individual location tracking.
241
  According 
to their newest findings, countries that are tracking their citizens have not shown a significant 
success in combatting the spread of COVID-19.
242
 Without actual proof that the use of data is the 
best tool in this global fight of COVID-19, there is no justification for breaching human rights. It 
is crucial to point out that the use of the Electronic Communications Law for virus combatting 
purposes is neither proportionate nor effective. 
The Frontier highlighted another interesting aspect of the new regulations. Governments took 
this idea of location and data use from Asia, where Governments are usually not transparent 
about their actions towards their citizens. However, in Europe, Government transparency is vital. 
In the present case, not only Governments around the globe are not transparent, they are not 
transparent about their future plans regarding data tracking in the future.
243
 In Latvia, there is no 
regulation on what is going to happen with obtained data in future, how long can data of 
COVID-19 positive persons be stored? COVID-19 is raising rage crimes against Chinese people. 
Wrongful storage of data that is obtained from people who suffer from COVID-19 could lead to 
a leakage of data and could potentially lead to multiple crimes that are driven by hate and fear of 
COVID-19.
244
  
The location of the suspect in a COVID-19 case is breaching the principle of proportionality, 
because the same goal could be reached by a police officer. Instead of obtaining data of 
particular suspects who could be violating self-quarantine or isolation, the state police could 
make a randomised time home visit. If the person is not at home during the police visit, then 
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person can be fined according to the law. I was one of those who returned to Latvia after 
boarders were already closed. During the quarantine I received multiple phone calls from the 
state police and the state police came once to check if I were truly at home. Since the new 
regulations allow to track only those who are COVID-19 positive I would propose two case 
scenarios that would be a lot more effective and also would also comply with human rights.  
First way to limit the spread of the virus is similar to already existing regulations. As soon as a 
person is registered as a COVID-19 positive, a person should be asked to sign an agreement that 
their address of self-quarantine, name and surname can be used for national security reasons until 
the end of illness. Once the individual is home, in order to check whether person is home, the 
police should operate multiple home visits at different times of the day.    
Second and more efficient way to combat COVID-19. When crossing a boarder and upon arrival 
in Latvia people should be required to fill out a form that consist of date of arrival, name, 
surname, address of a place where the person will isolate himself for the next 14 days. The State 
Police should gather this data with information from hospitals about persons who tested positive 
with COVID-19. All those who are in isolation should be checked regularly by home visits. This 
way the police would control those who are possibly ill because they were abroad. Since this 
virus was brought in by a traveller, it is not effective to only monitor those who are ill. Currently, 
for all travellers who just came back from their travels it is advised to stay at home, but there is 
no supervision. By monitoring all risk groups with the help of the police, the result of limitation 
would be reached better and in a less harmful way.  
All the data that law enforcement currently has and that has been stored by internet providers 
gives a lot more information about the user. When a person is connected to a public internet 
provider, this provider is collecting that person’s name, surname and location. It is then 
processing what each person is doing and with that it gains access to a person’s interests, hobbies 
and even an occupation.
245
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Access to such data is granted with reasoning that in my opinion is way too broad. The legislator 
has to balance out a person’s rights to privacy and interests of the state. With this particular law, 
author believes that Latvian authorities have more powers than it should have. 
246
 
In my opinion, all arguments mentioned above prove without a doubt that Latvia is breaching its 
obligations under the European Union law. The Current situation proves very strongly that there 
is an urgent need for a court judgement, because despite the already existing Electronic 
Communications Law that should not be in force, the Latvian legislator is widening its 
applicability range. It is proven over time by multiple countries that paper can take up all 
mistakes and the fact that a law is in force does not mean that the law is lawful.
247
  
The existing legal problem is way too complex, and it is not solved by the existing framework. 
There is a need to set out more detailed provisions on how the obtained data can be used. Author 
would advise that particular situations are set out in which a state can ask for an individual’s 
data. State security or national protection is too broad.  
Recently, the situation in regarding to the national law became even more problematic, because 
due to the emergency situation national law is used to obtain data. The problem here is that 
emergency allows medical personnel to obtain information about a person solely because of the 
fear of the COVID-19. That is allowed, because data is obtained for national security reasons. At 
first, it seems to be valid, because Latvia is trying to limit the spread of COVID-19. However, 
there is no regulation mentioned in the law itself on how medical personnel must evaluate 
whether or not there is a need to obtain data. When it comes to providers, they have to blindly 
agree to give out personal data on the grounds of pure suspicion. National law is giving a 
medical professional a free card to obtain data, where, in my opinion, this should be evaluated by 
the first instance judge.   New announcements also raise a question of how long medical 
personnel can keep this obtained data.  
The use of private data should be the last resort, not just another tool to use in order to combat a 
virus. The general principles of international public law allows to obtain personal data only in 
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order to achieve general interest, that in most cases means combatting truly serious crimes. The 
term serious crimes should also, for the sake of clarity be specified. Author would propose that 
the data of a private person should only be obtained in the situation of crimes against children, 
kidnapping, murder and terrorism. In the case Digital Rights Ireland
248
 the European Court of 
Justice also criticised lack of clarity in what constitutes a “serious crime” and I agree with this 
court conclusion, because term “serious crime” is too broad.  
In order for the law to pass the limitation test, it is needed to narrow down “serious crime”. Only 
then limitations made to a person’s right to privacy would be seen as appropriate, necessary and 
proportionate. Limitations cannot be put on persons who have done less serious crimes as it is in 
the case of limitations allowed in the COVID-19 context, because there simply are many other, 
less restrictive ways that can achieve the same aim, to limit the spread of the virus.
249
Police 
home visits are just as if not more effective than collecting data of a person’s location. Existing 
electronic communications law is not proportionate for fighting the virus spread. Democratic 
values are breached by allowing the obtainment of data for this cause, because it is causing more 
risk to a person’s privacy than it is doing good for the society as a whole. Thus, the new 
regulation is failing the test that is cumulative. 
In the democratic country people trust state institutions to protect them and are no longer raising 
questions or testing the authorities whether they are truly acting on behalf of the democratic 
society and in their best interests.
250
 The Electronic Communications Law allows to gather 
information of everyone, both innocent and guilty. There are also those, who willingly allow 
their data to be obtained by thinking that they have nothing to hide or there is nothing interesting 
happening in their lives. That is an alarming idea, because people are not aware or are in comfort 
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that their human rights are being breached. No one can take away a person’s human rights unless 
it is for a justifiable reason.  
  
56 
 
3. Correlation between Electronic Communications Law and the Directive 
2006/24/EC 
 
There are many similarities between the Directive
251
 and the Electronic Communications Law. In 
this chapter author will analyse whether the Electronic Communications Law could be violating 
the same fundamental principles and have the same nature as the Directive. In previous chapters 
I explained why the Directive lost its force and what are the problematic aspect of the Electronic 
Communications Law before the emergency of a state was declared and what problems rose 
during the emergency situation caused by COVID - 19. 
The European Court of Justice Judgement created a wave claims that were submitted to the 
national court all around Europe, because multiple national actors wanted to challenge their 
directive based national data retention laws. All claims were based on privacy infringement.    
Sweden and the United Kingdom were the first countries to put their national data retention laws 
to the test, after the Directive became invalid. The European Court of Justice in a preliminary 
ruling held that national law
252
 that allowed mass surveillance of electronic communications for 
the purpose of fighting crime, violated the right to privacy and the right to data protection.
253
In 
the joint case, an operator company from Sweden and a few private entities from the United 
Kingdom presented their national data retention laws just like in the Digital Rights Ireland
254
 
case of the Directive.  
There is a direct link between Sweden’s and the United Kingdom’s data retention laws and the 
Latvian Electronic Communications law. Firstly, these laws consisted of norms that were taken 
directly from the Directive. Secondly, they all have a very broad regulation on when data have to 
be retained, who can ask for permission to access such data and they are lacking explanation on 
what is considered a state emergency. Thirdly, courts have found that existing regulations are 
placing unproportioned restrictions on the fundamental human rights. Thus, it can be concluded 
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that there could be a standing case before the Constitutional court or the European Court of 
Justice against Latvia on the same grounds as in the Sweden and United Kingdom’s joint cases. 
There is an urgent need for at least an amendment of the Latvian national communications law. 
The Electronic Communications law, if not invalidated, then it should be amended in order to 
make sure it is in accordance with the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union and 
the European Union Convention of human rights so that a person’s right to privacy is truly 
protected. 
In the text of the law it is written that limitations are made only in the situation when there is a 
general interest of a state and public. While it is beautifully written and a general interest is the 
reason why and how states can interfere in people’s rights, the existing law is way too broad to 
achieve the aim.  
The effect of Covid-19 is not in line with the court finding in the Digital Rights Ireland.
255
 The 
regulations violate the court’s ruling, because the access of data of an individual is not reviewed 
by a court or independent administrative body. A review before access to data is important 
because the possibility of wrongful use is then lowered. There is also a need to have strict 
limitations on the retention period. The court did not take a final stance on existing national 
retention periods but indicates that a duration of six months has already been considered as 
reasonable. The European Court of Justice further requested that national laws expressly include 
an obligation to delete any retained data once its use is no longer necessary in combating serious 
crime. Currently, the Electronic Communications Law allows to store obtained data for more 
than six months and there are no norms that indicate how retained data should be stored or 
deleted. Moreover, because of the Covid-19 regulations, it even easier to access personal data, 
thus the violations of human rights are more visible and state actions are clearly harming human 
rights to privacy.   
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In order to prove that the Latvian national position on data retention is against European Union’s 
law, it is important to see how other member states of the European Union acted, after the 
Directive lost its validity.
256
 
In June 2015, the Belgian Constitutional Court ruled that the national law implementing the 
Directive is no longer valid. Following the announcement, the Belgian legislator drafted a new 
law, based on the findings in the Digital Rights Ireland judgment. The new law fixed the flaws 
that the previous one had. Firstly, new amendments of a national law established proportionality 
because it allowed to obtain a person’s data only in cases where it was a grave necessity. 
Further, Belgium strictly narrowed down who can claim access to a person’s data. Newly 
amended law introduced a norm that requires a crime to reach a certain level of seriousness in 
order to retain the data of a person. Lastly, the old time limit of how long data can be stored was 
shortened, allowing to store all data only for six months instead of one year. Interesting twist in 
the Belgium legislation was the fact that a few professions like lawyers and journalists were 
designated as a special protection group because of their profession aspects like right to not give 
up their source of information. The law was adopted on the May 29, 2016 and entered into effect 
on July 28, 2016. 
France established its national data retention law back in June 21, 2004
257
. According to the law, 
electronic communications operators must retain specific data that could be necessary for 
investigations or the prosecution of criminal offence for the state authorities that are involved in 
this, as well as for other specific administrative or governmental authorities. French law allows 
to store data that consists of information that allows to identify phone user and the technical 
aspects of his or her communications. The French data retention law allows to store data for a 
period of one year.  
The French law is almost identical to the Latvian Electronic Communications Law and they both 
came in force in the same year. Yet, there is one important difference. Unlike the Electronic 
Communications Law, the French supreme administrative court ruled that the French national 
law does not comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union because it is 
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breaching fundamental rights to privacy. As mentioned before, the same argument towards 
privacy were made during the annulment of the Directive.  
Germany also had its own national data retention law, that was established in accordance with 
the Directive.
258
 In 2010 the German Constitutional Court declared that national data retention 
could no longer be in force. Later in 2015 the German legislator took the same steps as Belgium 
by  establishing a  new law
259
 that consisted of more restrictions on who can ask for a person’s 
data, as well as reduced the time limit of how long a provider store data up until ten weeks as 
well as divided the limit by establishing a lower time limit of only one month of location data. 
Unlike other countries I have researched, the Germany particularly focused on time limits. The 
Electronic Communications law has only very vague and broad time limits for data storage and 
there are no legal norms that would regulate when or how data must be erased. The German law 
also prohibits to store information about visited web pages and the location data can only be used 
in order to find the general geographic area of person. German data law also allows to store 
obtained data only in the cases of serious crimes, to obtain personal data in the cases of serious 
crime investigation and when there is a need to prevent a concrete danger to the state or to the 
life or liberty of a person.  
Italy took a different approach than the other countries. The validity of the national data retention 
laws was challenged by Italian Data Protection Authority. The claim for a better regulation that 
is not violating human rights worked and the Italian Privacy Code was amended. New 
amendments changed how long providers can store personal data. 
In March 2015, the Netherlands suspended the Dutch Telecommunications Data Act.
260
 This 
decision was made in the light of Digital Rights Ireland judgment. However, the issue was raised 
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not by a court or a national data agency. The validity question was raised by a member of the 
Dutch House of Representatives.
261
 Furthermore, the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice has 
announced plans for a legislative proposal to amend the Telecommunications Act
262
and the Code 
of Criminal Procedure
263
in view of maintaining acceptable retention obligations under national 
law. 
In Spain the Directive was implemented back in 2007, October 18 with national Law 25/2007.
264
 
The law allowed to obtain addresses and other data related to electronic communications and 
public communications networks. Unlike previously mentioned countries, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court found no violations of this law. However, the reasoning why the Spanish 
Constitutional Court found no issue with the law was simply because right after the Directive 
lost its validity, Spain amended its law by adding much stricter  regulations, for example, that 
data can only be obtained if such information is needed for criminal investigations.  
In the United Kingdom the Directive was implemented in 2009 with the Data Retention 
Regulations 2009. After the Directive was announced to be invalid, the United Kingdom passed 
the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. This act was established as a temporary 
tool to fill the holes that the Directive left. A year later, the United Kingdom’s High Court held 
that the Act just like the Directive violated human rights.  
Romania, just like other countries did their duty as a member of the European Union and adopted 
a national data retention law No. 298 and amended law No.506/2004.
265
 Whenever the question 
of human right violations was raised, the government justified those possible violations with 
threats to national security. Despite government’s arguments, in 2009 the Constitutional Court of 
Romania declared that both data retention laws are violating the rights of Romanian citizens to 
privacy and the court stated that there is a clear violations towards privacy and that laws cannot 
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meet with their purpose.
266
 Unlike other countries, Romania proved that the Directive and laws 
that were established on grounds of it twice. Despite the arguments made by the Constitutional 
Court of Romania in 2009, the European Union forced to comply with the obligations and 
despite all arguments keep the national laws. As soon as the Directive lost its validity, the 
Constitutional Court, in 2014 declared that the national data retention laws are invalid, just like 
the Directive.
267
  
In Austria, all data retention laws were declared invalid by the Constitutional Court in 27 June, 
2014.
268
 Decision was made due to the Ireland Digital Rights judgement of 8 March 2014.
269
 
Bulgarian Constitutional Court on 12 March 2015 found that national data retention laws are 
against Bulgarian constitution.
270
 
There are some countries that currently have an active case before their Constitutional Courts. 
Those countries are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary have found the relation with Tele2 
judgement, but have still made no amendments to the law.
271
 There are also countries like 
Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Poland
272
 who have national data retention law that has not yet been 
challenged
273
 
Overall, countries in the European Union have chosen to either establish a new data retention law 
or make amendments to the law that already exists. State practice shows that Latvia has two 
options. While the existing legal framework is causing harm to both the national and the 
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international legal system and to the human rights of Latvian citizens, the Electronic 
Communications Law could be amended in a way that would make it lawful and valid. 
The law that regulates personal data must consist of incredibly clear measures and it must be 
used only in cases where there are threats of terrorism. Definitions should be set out clearly, 
without any space for wrongful interpretations.
274
 The law needs to establish legal norms that 
sets out how to deal in a situation when fundamental human rights are infringed. 
Technological evolution happens fast and sadly, as much as data privacy is evolving, has still not 
caught up to modern society needs and situations that seek regulation and because of that there is 
a strong need for regulation.
275
 The Directive tried to seek harmonisation between member states 
but failed. The Electronic Communications law is currently used as a weapon to combat the 
spread of a pandemic virus, but it failed. What we are facing is an old problem in a new era, so 
the only path to safeguard fundamental rights is to end an era of laws that are generated from the 
Directive and establish new data retention laws that are applicable to this technology decade. 
Data that is obtained by technology made in 2020 cannot be regulated by a law that was 
established in 2004. It is time for technology related laws to grow.  
The European Parliament in 2004 published a first report on the implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC.
276
 This report shows that the European Parliament was in fact 
truly concerned that the national data retention laws are not fully in accordance with rights that 
are granted by the European Convention of Human Rights, because they were described as 
unproportioned and unnecessary in the democratic society.
277
 This is an argument that never 
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reached the Latvian authorities, despite the fact that the Electronic Communications Law fully 
complies with the description made by the European Parliament.
278
  
It is not possible to resolve issues that the Directive and the Electronic Communications Law 
have raised in the past and now. Yet, this master thesis is the first step towards informing the 
public of Latvia that our human rights have been breached for the last 14 years. In order to solve 
this issue, competent experts of data privacy, human rights experts and other experts have to 
come together.
279
  
Just like the Directive, the Electronic Communications Law is causing legal uncertainty. Legal 
uncertainty exists because there are no strict provisions. The Electronic Communications Law is 
used to combat COVID-19, but is it clear from the legal norms, how and on what grounds 
medical personnel can ask for data? Will this data be used and how will it be deleted? All those 
questions remain unanswered. 
The Directive never reached its goal and it is clear that neither will the Electronic 
Communications Law. The Latvian Centre for Disease Prevention and Control epidemiologist 
Jurjis Perevoščikovs gave a public statement that the  use of the Electronic Communications Law 
is not useful for supervising whether a person is at home or not.
280
 Further, the vice president 
Ingmārs Pūķis of Latvian Mobile Telephone spoke on the same issue. He claimed, that the 
location data is not as precise, thus it cannot be used for supervision purposes.
281
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3.1 Arguments presented by the European Court of Justice 
 
The similarities of the Directive and the Electronic Communications law uncourtly exist. To go 
even further, author decided to take the arguments used by the European Court of Justice and 
apply them to the Electronic Communications Law in order to see if they correspond. 
The Electronic Communications Law and the Directive both allow to use obtained data for the 
purpose of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, such as 
organised crime and terrorism, in compliance with the rights laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter.
282
 The European Court of Justice declared, that the obtained information can point to a 
specific person. The Directive did not have a complete list of information that it allowed to 
obtain, thus the court had to go through the whole Directive to find it out. Unlike the Directive, 
the Electronic Communications Law has Annex 1 and Annex 2 where all obtainable information 
is listed. Can the court’s findings be applied in the case of the Electronic Communications Law? 
Yes, definitely, because it allows to obtain precisely the same information that the Directive 
allowed to obtained.
283
 When Article 5 is placed next to both Annexes, it is clear that the Latvian 
legislator took Article 5 of the Directive, translated the text to Latvian, changed the order of 
words and directly copied it into the European Communications Law. Since the amount of 
information and type of data is identical, it can be concluded that the obtained data allows to 
precisely identify a person and its social circle.  Information retained can show person’s habits, 
places where person has lived, which routs a person takes and also identify relationships between 
people. 
Bearing in mind that as of now, there is a regulation that allows to gain access to such 
information just on the ground of suspicion, the human rights violation could be gather that it 
was in the case of the Directive. The amount of information is also against the data protection 
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requirements.
284
 Further, author aligns with the Advocate General who pointed out
285
 that the list 
of data that is allowed to be obtained is damaging the system of protection of the right to privacy 
established by Directives 95/46 and 2002/58 with regard to the processing of personal data in the 
electronic communications sector.
286
 
The European Court of Justice has pointed out, that the fact that retained data can be reached by 
the competent national authorities also constitutes as an even further interference with the 
fundamental rights.
287
 Because of the court’s findings, it was concluded that the Directive’s 
Article 4 and Article 8 violated the Article 7 of the Charter.
288
 Access to the data according to the 
Electronic Communications law is granted to the Ministry of Transport
289
for the purpose of 
fulfilling the functions of the Ministry of Transport, State Joint-Stock Company Electronic 
Communications Office also has rights to receive the information necessary for the fulfilment of 
the functions of the State joint-stock company Electronic Communications Office.
290
  
The Regulator can obtain information which is necessary for fulfilment of the functions of the 
Regulator.
291
 The obtained data is available to the director of the Constitution Protection 
Bureau.
292
 The Regulator after the receipt of a substantiated request, have ensure that the relevant 
information is accessible to the European Commission, the Latvian State administrative 
institutions and other European Union Member State regulators.
293
 Further, all obtained data has 
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to be available to pre-trial investigation institutions, bodies .performing operational activities, the 
state security institutions, the Prosecution Office and the court in order to protect State and 
public security or to ensure the investigation of criminal offences, criminal prosecution and 
criminal court proceedings, as well as to the Competition Council for investigating violations of 
the competition law which manifests as restrictive agreements.
294
 
All institutions that I have mentioned before show that the Electronic Communications Law 
gives access to obtained data to more institutions than the Directive. To my surprise, only Article 
71
1 
(1) mentions multiple institutions who can have access to the data.
295
This brings me to the 
conclusion, that the text hides the full list of institutions who can access the retention data. I had 
to look closely in order to find out who has access to the retained data. If a person would look 
over the law not so carefully, he would only see the institutions that are written in the Article 71.
1
 
(1).
296
  
Another issue the author found with the articles that set out the institutions who can have access 
to the data is that they all are really broad. They all consist of a phrase: “[…] is necessary for 
fulfilment of the functions”. 297 There is no description of what those functions are. Further, on 
the March 29, 2020 the Government of Latvia adopted stricter rules to limit the assembly of 
people at private and public events. Those restrictions included that for the purposes of 
conducting an epidemiological investigation and verifying the veracity of information on 
movement provided by a person and upon the request of the Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control, the State Police will have the right to request information from electronic 
communications operators on specific persons who may have a status of infected person or 
contact person.
298
  
The Latvian Minister of Health, Ilze Vinķele stated that stricter rules will not be used to find out 
what kind of routs people take. Rather, obtained data will be used only for epidemiological 
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investigations.
299
 The fact that the obtained data can be accessed by another institution and the 
fact that there are so many institutions that can use and claim data proves, that the Electronic 
Communications Law violates article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter
300
. A violation can be 
proved, because this law gives access to even more institutions than the Directive. Thus, the 
same argumentation that the European Court of Justice used can be applied to the situation at 
hand.
301
  
Subsequently, the violation of fundamental human rights is serious and by widening the count of 
institutions who can have access to personal data, the government of Latvia could generate the 
feeling that private lives in Latvia are the subject of constant surveillance.
302
 
As author have mentioned before, human rights can be restricted, but only if the limitation is 
necessary in a democratic society. In the case of the Directive, the European Court of Justice 
found that the Directive was used to combat terrorism and other serious crimes.
303
 Subsequently, 
the Electronic Communications Law is also a tool to combat crime in Latvia. There is no need to 
use the Electronic Communications Law for terrorism combatting, because according to the 
information published by the Latvian State Security Service, the terrorism threat level in Latvia 
is low.
304
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Despite the lack of terrorism, which is a great thing for Latvia, the Electronic Communications 
Law is, just like the Directive
305
 ,a great tool for serious crime combatting and investigations. 
Crime combatting constitutes a state security matter, so there is no doubt, that some level of 
justification for human rights violations exists. But the level of justification is not so high that it 
would justify a retention measure such as that established by the Electronic Communications 
Law being necessary for the purpose of that fight.
306
 
The Electronic Communications Law fails to lay down clear and precise rules on how data is 
stored, what the limits for accessing the data are and what constitutes a valid reason for obtaining 
personal data. The Directive failed to answer those questions and the European Court of 
Justice
307
 pointed out that lack of answers to those questions are putting personal data at the risk 
of abuse, because no one can guarantee that the personal data will be used in accordance with 
law.
308
 Same argumentation can be applied to the Electronic Communications law, because more 
state authorities have access to personal data and this law has no article that explains what should 
be understood by the phrase: “necessary for fulfilment of the functions”. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the Electronic Communications Law, just like the Directive is putting retained 
personal data at the risk of unlawful use.
309
 
The European Court of Justice concluded that the Directive was used in a way that went beyond 
what was strictly necessary, because it allowed to obtain personal data of the whole population of 
the European Union. Thus, the fundamental rights of all citizens of the European Union were 
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violated.
310
 Surely, the Electronic Communications Law is not breaching human rights of the 
whole Europe. Yet, the personal data obtained by the Latvian institutions are allowed to be 
shared with all the European Union’s member states, if it is necessary.  How the Latvian 
institutions conclude what is necessary and what is not necessary is unknown. However, just like 
the Directive, the Electronic Communications Law  covers, in a generalised manner, all Latvian 
citizens or residents that are in the jurisdiction of Latvia and all means of electronic 
communication as well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception 
being made in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime.
311
 Is there really a link 
between a person and an unsolved crime? The answer is no, because even if there are no crimes 
and even if the person has not committed a single crime in his lifetime, his data will still be 
obtained and his data can be used as far as institutions find it necessary. How far is that? During 
my research the answer to this question was not found.  
However, also those limits are causing an issue, because there is no separation on what kind of 
data is stored for a period that is lower than 18 or 24 months. Further, what happens to the data 
that cannot be longer stored? There is no regulation on how data must be erased. The fact that the 
Electronic Communication and the Directive are both limitless. The only limit that can be found 
in both legal instruments is how long data must be kept. For the Electronic Communications 
Law, the time limit is 18 months
312
, but for the Directive it was a period not less than six months 
and not more than two years.  
The Communications Law fails to set out clear and precise rules towards governing the extent of 
the interference with the fundamental rights that are granted to everyone by Articles 7 and 8 of 
the Charter. This proves that just like the Directive, the Electronic Communications Law entails 
a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental human rights.
313
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Further, all the above mentioned issues with the Electronic Communications Law prove, that it 
fails to ensure rules relating to the security and protection of data retained by providers of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks. 
Subsequently, national law cannot establish sufficient safeguards, as required by Article 8 of the 
Charter, to ensure effective protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and against 
any unlawful access and use of that data. Just like the Directive,  the Electronic Communications 
Law does not lay down rules which are specific and adapted to the vast quantity of data whose 
retention is required by that directive,  the sensitive nature of that data and the risk of unlawful 
access to that data, rules which would serve, in particular, to govern the protection and security 
of the data in question in a clear and strict manner in order to ensure their full integrity and 
confidentiality. 
314
 
Author have applied the same arguments to the Electronic Communications Law, that the court 
used in the judgement that declared the Directive invalid. Last argument of the court was that the 
Directive did not comply with the principle of proportionality. Since all arguments presented by 
the court were applicable to the Electronic Communication Law, it can be concluded, that the 
law is also breaching the principle of proportionality.  
Surely, author have no powers to declare a national law valid or invalid, but my research proves 
that the Electronic Communications Law is breaching the same fundamental human rights as the 
Directive was. The existing state of emergency in Latvia is causing an even deeper violation of 
fundamental rights, thus the arguments presented by the Ministry of Transport and the Data State 
Inspection are invalid and they cannot stand against the clearly visible arguments that origin 
from the comparison of the Directive and the Electronic Communications Law.  
Lastly, there are no doubts that the right to privacy and data protection are not an absolute right. 
Such rights are balanced every day against other people’s and state’s needs. Personal data is used 
to combat crime and to safeguard people’s health. Yet, in Latvia those restrictions upon the right 
to privacy and the right to personal data are unproportionate. As proven above, the Directive and 
the Electronic Communications Law are almost identical, thus the same violation of the right to 
privacy that the Directive put upon Europe, is currently visible in Latvia. The State institutions 
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are using the same reservations as in the Digital rights Ireland case. They are hiding behind the 
state security argument, but none of the institutions have ever used the proportionality test to see, 
if Article 71 is truly applicable.  
The European Court of Justice once already ruled that this kind of law instrument is invalid. The 
practice of multiple countries in the European Union has proved that the norms that were 
transposed from the Directive cannot be in force, because they are not just and are breaching 
human rights. stand with the honourable court, those member states who are pro data protection 
and pro privacy. The fact that the General Data Protection Regulation that safeguards human 
rights to privacy and data coexists with a disruptive Electronic Communications Law is simply 
not right.  
During this research author also found out that the institutions in Latvia are following the written 
law. The received answers from the Ministry of Transport and the Data State Inspectorate both 
had the same argumentation – the Electronic Communications Law is valid, because the use of 
data in the name of state security is allowed. But if something is prescribed by law, is it always 
valid and just in the light of human rights? Author truly believes that anyone who will read this 
master thesis will conclude the same answer as author did. If not, there is a hope, that it will lead 
to a loud and successful discussion.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The main goal of the European Union is to ensure freedom, security and justice for all people 
who find themselves within its borders. To fulfil this goal, people have to trust in both, the 
European Union and their national legislator. Nevertheless, legislators have to keep the European 
Union’s values in mind, when they are developing or adopting any regulations.315  
There is no doubt that the most important rights are the fundamental human rights. The 
fundamental right to privacy ensures that the individual feel safe in the country they have chosen 
to live in. Fundamental human rights have to be protected in national and international level. To 
do so, there is a need to have a proper legal instrument.
316
 The Directive was adopted with a 
good intentions, but as the European Court of Justice concluded, goal to ensure security cannot 
justify the violation of privacy. Author agrees with the European Court of Justice, that the 
retained data is a great tool to use during investigations, but the issue is how many and which 
state authorities can have access to personal data.  
During this research, author have found multiple similarities that both the Directive and the 
Electronic Communications Law share. Both legal instruments are full of uncertainties and is 
lacking supervision aspect. According to the Electronic Communications Law, the access to 
personal data is not granted by a judge. Rather, this law consists of Articles that names those 
institutions who can have access to the data. The problematic aspect is all those norms consist of 
a phrase: “[…] is necessary for fulfilment of the functions”. 317 Yet, there is no description of 
what those functions are or what is considered to be a necessity.  
New regulations allow the Centre for Disease Prevention with the permission of the state police 
to gain access to personal data. Author concluded that such actions are against fundamental 
rights to privacy. Police upon the request from the Centre for Disease Prevention can share 
location data and phone numbers of a persons who are suffering from COVID-19 or there is a 
suspicion that a person could be ill. Just like the Directive, the new restrictions that are 
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established to ensure state security does not hold up to a proportionality principle, because there 
are more effective ways how to achieve the goal and not violate fundamental rights. Considering 
the powers of police, it would be better for a judge to declare whether it is truly necessary to gain 
access to data.  
Even without the new regulations, the Electronic Communications Law is unjust and should be 
invalid. As the Ministry of Transport and the Data State Inspectorate pointed out, this law is used 
to combat serious crimes. Yet, as the author proved in this thesis, the use of this law for crime 
combatting is unproportioned. The same conclusion was made by the European Court of justice 
in regard to the Directive.  
Further, in order to show the new habits of people in times of state emergency, the University of 
Latvia and the SIA “Latvijas Mobilais Telefons” conducted a research, that was concluded using 
the location data. According to the Constitution of Latvia
318
 and the European Convention on 
Human Rights
319
, sharing personal data with third parties is a violation of data protection.  
All the above mentioned violations were found by the European Court of Justice. Those 
violations were the reason why the Directive became invalid. However, the Electronic 
Communications Law continues to cause widespread fundamental rights violations across Latvia 
and could cause more damage, if internet access provider servers would be hacked or if the 
electronic communications operators would face cyberattacks. 
After comparing the Directive and the Electronic Communications Law, author concluded that 
the existing law have the same structure as the Directive. It almost looks like the Electronic 
Communications Law is a translated version of the Directive. Unfortunately, this law is also 
breaching the same fundamental rights. That is why it is important to follow the majority of 
member states, who invalidated their national retention laws, right after the Directive was 
declared to be invalid.  
In the Republic of Latvia, were a sovereign and human rights are the top priority, there is no 
place for a law like this, which degrades the right to privacy. Author believes that this thesis is 
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the first step towards invalidation of the Electronic Communications Law, because it consists of 
arguments that needs to be presented to a wider public to show how their rights have been 
violated for the past 16 years.  
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Par elektronisko sakaru datu izmantošanu 
 
Satiksmes ministrija ir saņēmusi Jūsu 2020. gada. 6. aprīļa elektroniskā pasta iesniegumu 
ar jautājumiem par Elektronisko sakaru likumu kontekstā ar Latvijas Universitātes (turpmāk - 
LU) un sabiedrības ar ierobežotu atbildību “Latvijas mobilais telefons” (turpmāk - LMT) veikto 
pētījumu, kas publicēts portālā “LSM.lv”, un ar datu izsniegšanu Slimību profilakses un 
kontroles centram (turpmāk - SPKC)  epidemioloģiskās izmeklēšanas veikšanai un Covid-19 
ierobežošanai. 
Atbildot uz pirmo jautājumu, skaidrojam, ka saskaņā ar likuma “Par valsts institūciju 
darbību ārkārtējās situācijas laikā saistībā ar Covid-19 izplatību” 33.pantu “Valsts policija pēc 
Slimību profilakses un kontroles centra lūguma pieprasa un elektronisko sakaru komersanti tai 
sniedz datus (telefona numurs un atrašanās vieta) par personu, kuru Slimību profilakses un 
kontroles centrs ir identificējis kā ar Covid-19 inficētas personas kontaktpersonu vai personu, 
kurai laboratoriski apstiprināta Covid-19 diagnoze. Valsts policija no elektronisko sakaru 
komersanta saņemtos datus nodod Slimību profilakses un kontroles centram epidemioloģiskās 
izmeklēšanas veikšanai”. 
Tādējādi, Valsts policija, saņemot SPKC pieprasījumu par konkrētu personu, saskaņā ar 
Ministru kabineta 2007. gada 4. decembra noteikumos Nr.820 “Kārtība, kādā pirmstiesas 
izmeklēšanas iestādes, operatīvās darbības subjekti, valsts drošības iestādes, Konkurences 
padome, prokuratūra un tiesa pieprasa un elektronisko sakaru komersants nodod saglabājamos 
datus, un kārtība, kādā apkopo statistisko informāciju par saglabājamo datu pieprasījumiem un 
to izsniegšanu” noteikto kārtību pieprasa no elektronisko sakaru komersanta konkrētus datus un 
pēc to saņemšanas nodod tos SPKC. Līdz ar to secināms, ka dati tiek iegūti uz likumiska pamata 
un tikai tādā apjomā, lai SPKC īstenotu savus pienākumus ārkārtas situācijas laikā. Vienlaikus 
tiek ievērota arī regulējumā nostiprinātā datu izsniegšanas kārtība.  
Saistībā ar otro jautājumu Satiksmes ministrija, apzinot informāciju, ir secinājusi, ka LU 
un LMT pētījumā tika izmantota “mobilā tīkla notikumu statistika”,  citiem vārdiem – vispārīgi 
dati par bāzes staciju noslodzes izmaiņām pirms gada un šogad. Līdz ar to šāds detalizācijas 
līmenis satur tikai vispārīgu informāciju par kopējo noslodzi konkrētā bāzes stacijā un pētījums 
nesatur datus par identificējamu galalietotāju. Ņemot to vērā, secināms, ka pētījumā nav 
izmantoti dati, kuru izmantošana ir regulēta Elektronisko sakaru likumā. Tādējādi nav 
saskatāms Elektronisko sakaru likumā noteikto prasību par galalietotāju personas datu 
aizsardzību pārkāpums. 
Rīgā 29.04.2020 Nr. 01-13/1551 
uz 06.04.2020. Nr.  
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Annex 2: Letter from the State Data Inspectorate  
Labdien, 
Atbildot uz Jūsu 2020.gada 6.aprīļa elektroniskā pasta vēstuli informējam, ka atbildes uz Jūsu 
jautājumiem tiks sniegtas tādā secībā, kādā tie ir uzdoti: 
1.         Ziņas par personas telefona numuru un atrašanās vietu ir personas privātās dzīves 
sastāvdaļa. Šo datu nodošana trešajai personai neatkarīgi no nodotās informācijas tālākās 
izmantošanas aizskar attiecīgo personu privāto dzīvi un līdz ar to uzskatāma par privātās dzīves 
ierobežojumu Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 96.panta un Eiropas Cilvēka tiesību un 
pamatbrīvību konvencijas 8.panta izpratnē. 
Kā vairākkārtīgi atzinusi Satversmes tiesa, Eiropas Cilvēktiesību tiesa un Eiropas Savienības 
tiesa, privātās dzīves ierobežojums attaisnojams, ja tas ir noteikts ar likumu, nepieciešams 
demokrātiskā sabiedrībā leģitīmu mērķu sasniegšanai un ir samērīgs ar tā mērķi. 
Satversmes tiesa (2003.gada 5.jūnija spriedums lietā Nr.2003-02-0106, 2003.gada 29.oktobra 
spriedums lietā Nr.2003-05-01, 1999.gada 6.jūlija sprieduma lietā Nr.04-02(99) u.c.) un Latvijas 
Republikas Augstākā tiesa (2011.gada 12.janvāra lēmums lietā Nr.SKA–221/2011, 2010.gada 
1.jūlija spriedums lietā Nr. SKA–347/2010 2007.gada 8.jūnija spriedums lietā Nr.SKA-194/2007 
u.c.) norāda, ka izvērtējot, vai indivīda tiesību ierobežojums ir attaisnots, jāvērtē, vai 
ierobežojums ir paredzēts likumā, tas ir vērsts uz leģitīma mērķa sasniegšanu un ir nepieciešams 
demokrātiskā sabiedrībā, pārbaudot, vai ierobežojumi ir sociāli nepieciešami un samērīgi. 
Satversmes tiesa 2010.gada 18.februāra spriedumā lietā Nr.2009-74-01 norāda, ka Satversmē 
noteiktās pamat tiesības var ierobežot, ja vien ierobežojums ir noteikts ar pienācīgā kārtā 
pieņemtu likumu, tam ir leģitīms mērķis un tas ir samērīgs. Savukārt 2011.gada 14.marta 
spriedumā lietā Nr.2010-51-01 Satversmes tiesa norāda, ka no starptautiskajiem cilvēktiesību 
aizsardzības dokumentiem vispirms izriet vispārīgie personas datu aizsardzības pamatprincipi: 
tiesiskums, taisnīgums, minimalitāte un anonimitāte. Šo principu kontekstā likumdevējam ir 
konstitucionāli noteikts pienākums pieņemt tādus tiesību aktus, kas garantētu datu drošību, kā arī 
noteiktu samērīgus ierobežojumus to izmantošanai. 
Saskaņā ar Eiropas Parlamenta un Padomes Regulas (ES) 2016/679 par fizisko personu 
aizsardzību attiecībā uz personas datu apstrādi un šādu datu brīvu apriti un ar ko atceļ Direktīvu 
95/46/EK (Vispārīgā datu aizsardzības regula) (turpmāk – Regula) 6.panta 1.punktu apstrāde ir 
likumīga tikai tādā apmērā un tikai tad, ja ir piemērojams vismaz viens no 6.panta 1.punktā 
minētajiem pamatojumiem (Regulā ir noteikti seši vispārīgi tiesiskie pamati: piekrišana, līguma 
izpilde, juridisks pienākums, sabiedrības intereses, vitālo interešu aizsardzība un leģitīmo 
interešu ievērošana). Proti, tikai pastāvot kādam no minētajiem tiesiskajiem pamatiem, personas 
datu apstrāde tiek atzīta par tiesisku. 
Jūsu 1.jautājumā minētais “sakaru operatori drīkst medicīnas darbiniekiem izsniegt Elektronisko 
sakaru likumā noteikto informāciju” nesniedz konkrētu informāciju, ko Jūs domājāt, minot 
medicīnas darbiniekus, proti, vai ir domāts ārstniecības iestāžu personāls, Slimību profilakses un 
kontroles centra personāls, neatliekamās medicīniskās palīdzības dienesta personāls u.c, līdz ar to 
Datu valsts inspekcija šobrīd nevar Jums sniegt konkrētu atbildi, vai elektronisko sakaru 
komersantu veikta darbība, izsniedzot medicīnas darbiniekiem Elektronisko sakaru likumā 
noteikto informāciju bez tiesneša akcepta, ir vērtējama kā privātuma pārkāpšana. 
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Vienlaikus, Datu valsts inspekcija informē, ka Elektronisko sakaru likuma 71.panta septītā daļa 
paredz, ka Elektronisko sakaru komersants drīkst apstrādāt atrašanās vietas datus bez lietotāja vai 
abonenta piekrišanas, ja atrašanās vietas datu apstrāde ir nepieciešama Valsts ugunsdzēsības un 
glābšanas dienestam, Valsts policijai, neatliekamās medicīniskās palīdzības un gāzes avārijas 
dienestiem, Jūras meklēšanas un glābšanas dienestam, kā arī Iekšlietu ministrijas Informācijas 
centram tā pienākumu veikšanai un šo datu nodošanai šajā panta daļā minētajiem dienestiem. 
Līdz ar to neatliekamās medicīniskās palīdzības dienestam ir tiesības saņemt no elektronisko 
sakaru komersantiem informāciju par personu atrašanas vietu. 
Tāpat, Likuma “Par valsts institūciju darbību ārkārtējās situācijas laikā saistībā ar Covid-19 
izplatību” 33.pants nosaka, ka Valsts policija pēc Slimību profilakses un kontroles centra lūguma 
pieprasa un elektronisko sakaru komersanti tai sniedz datus (telefona numurs un atrašanās vieta) 
par personu, kuru Slimību profilakses un kontroles centrs ir identificējis kā ar Covid-19 inficētas 
personas kontaktpersonu vai personu, kurai laboratoriski apstiprināta Covid-19 diagnoze. Valsts 
policija no elektronisko sakaru komersanta saņemtos datus nodod Slimību profilakses un 
kontroles centram epidemioloģiskās izmeklēšanas veikšanai. 
Līdz ar to konstatējams, ka Slimību profilakses un kontroles centrs arī tiesīgs apstrādāt 
informāciju, kura iegūta no elektronisko sakaru komersantiem. 
Ņemot vērā iepriekš minēto, Datu valsts inspekcija paskaidro, ka abos iepriekš minētajos 
gadījumos, datu apstrādes tiesiskais pamats ir Regulas 6.panta 1.punkta c) apakšpunkts (apstrāde 
ir vajadzīga, lai izpildītu uz pārzini attiecināmu juridisku pienākumu). 
2.         Jūsu elektroniskā pasta vēstulē minētā publikācija Latvijas Sabiedrisko Mediju portālā 
neliecina, kā arī Datu valsts inspekcijas rīcībā nav informācijas, ka Mobilā tīkla pētījumā, kuru 
veic Latvijas Universitātes (LU) un “Latvijas Mobilā telefona” (LMT) pētnieki, tiek apstrādāti 
personas dati. Vēršam uzmanību, ka Elektronisko sakaru likuma 71.panta otrā daļa paredz, ka 
atrašanās vietas datu apstrāde citam mērķim bez lietotāja vai abonenta piekrišanas ir atļauta tādā 
gadījumā, ja lietotāju vai abonentu nav iespējams identificēt, izmantojot šos atrašanās vietas 
datus. Ņemot vērā, ka norādītajā pētījumā tiek veikta statistiskas informācijas analīze, kas nav 
attiecināma uz konkrētu lietotāju, kā arī Inspekcijas rīcībā nav informācijas, ka LMT un/vai 
Latvijas Universitāte būtu statistiskās informācijas iegūšanai apstrādājuši datus, kas attiecināmi 
uz identificētām vai identificējamām personām, Inspekcija pašlaik neidentificē, ka pētījums tiktu 
veikts pretrunā ar Elektronisko sakaru likuma nosacījumiem. 
3.Savukārt attiecībā uz Jūsu jautājumu, vai Elektronisko sakaru likums nepārkāpj Eiropas 
Savienības Pamattiesību Hartas 7.pantu un Eiropas Cilvēktiesību 8.pantu, paskaidrojam, ka Datu 
valsts inspekcijas kompetenci, uzdevumus un tiesības noteic Regulas 55., 57., 58.pants un 
Fizisko personu datu apstrādes likuma 4. un 5.pants, kas neparedz tās tiesības vērtēt normatīvā 
akta atbilstību Regulai. Saskaņā ar Satversmes tiesas likuma 16.pantu Satversmes tiesa izskata 
lietas par citu normatīvo aktu vai to daļu atbilstību augstāka juridiska spēka tiesību normām 
(aktiem). Tas pats attiecināms uz šajā vēstulē iepriekš pieminēto likumu “Par valsts institūciju 
darbību ārkārtējās situācijas laikā saistībā ar Covid-19 izplatību”. 
 
Cieņā, Datu valsts inspekcija 
